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Contra Scalia, Thomas, and Gorsuch: 
Originalists Should Adopt A Living 
Constitution 
R. RANDALL KELSO* 
      
Two main approaches appear in the popular literature 
on constitutional interpretation: originalism and non-
originalism. An originalist approach refers back to some as-
pect of the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent or action to justify 
a decision. A non-originalist approach bases the goal of con-
stitutional interpretation in part on consideration of some 
justification independent of the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent 
or action. 
What is often unappreciated in addressing the question 
of whether to adopt an originalist or non-originalist ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation is the complication 
that emerges if one concludes that the framing and ratifying 
generation believed in the model of a living Constitution. 
Under such a model, later legislative, executive, or social 
practice, or judicial precedents, can change the meaning of 
a constitutional provision. Thus, while standard originalist 
supporters share the premise that the original meaning of 
constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is 
framed and ratified, interpretation according to originalism 
actually does not commit the interpreter to a static or fixed 
interpretation of the Constitution. Instead, a true originalist 
form of interpretation can incorporate the principle that the 
provision was capable of evolution over time.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
 *  Spurgeon E. Bell Distinguished Professor of Law, South Texas College of 
Law Houston. B.A., 1976, University of Chicago; J.D., 1979, University of Wis-
consin-Madison School of Law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two main approaches appear in the popular literature on consti-
tutional interpretation: originalism and non-originalism.1 As classi-
cally defined, an originalist approach refers to some aspect of the 
framers’ and ratifiers’ intent or action to justify a decision.2 A non-
originalist approach bases the goal of constitutional interpretation in 
part on consideration of some justification independent of the fram-
ers’ and ratifiers’ intent or action.3 
Among originalists, there is a debate whether the framers’ and 
ratifiers’ “original [subjective] intention” should govern (intent)4 or 
whether one should look instead to the “original meaning” of the 
words adopted by the framers and ratifiers (action).5 Even among 
                                                                                                             
 1 See generally Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 
DUKE L.J. 239, 241 (2009) (“For the last several decades, the primary divide in 
American constitutional theory has been between those theorists who label them-
selves as ‘originalists’ and those who do not.”) (footnote omitted); INTERPRETING 
THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 3–10 (Jack N. Rakove 
ed., 1990). 
 2 See generally Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 703 (2009) (“By this they 
meant the sense intended by the people who wrote and ratified it.”); Henry P. 
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.130 (1981) 
(“Although the intention of the ratifiers, not the Framers, is in principle decisive, 
the difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the ratifiers leaves little choice but to 
accept the intent of the Framers as a fair reflection of it.”) (citation omitted). 
 3 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Im-
plications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1238–39 
(2015) (noting interpretation theories of purposivists, living constitutionalists, 
textualists, legislative intentionalists, and originalists); Cass R. Sunstein, There Is 
Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193, 194 (2015) (not-
ing approaches called “democracy–reinforcement, ‘moral readings,’ minimalism, 
or broad deference to political processes” in addition to originalism) (footnotes 
omitted). For a classic discussion of non-originalist approaches or, in his termi-
nology, “non-interpretivist” approaches, see Michael J. Perry, Interpretivism, 
Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 263–65 
(1981). 
 4 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363–72 (1977) (specific historical intent should 
be the focus of constitutional interpretation); Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme 
Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 
455, 456, 465 (1986) (arguing for a “jurisprudence of original intention”). 
 5 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (“We look for 
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each of these two approaches, there are variations. For example, un-
der the “original intent” model of interpretation, is it specific or gen-
eral historical intent that is most critical?6 For “original meaning,” 
is it literal text or purpose that is the most critical in terms of textu-
alist interpretation?7 
                                                                                                             
a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person would gather 
from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris . . . . 
And the reason we adopt this objectified version is, I think, that it is simply in-
compatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, 
to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawmaker meant, rather than 
by what the lawgiver promulgated . . . . It is the law that governs, not the intent of 
the lawgiver.”). But see Kay, supra note 2, at 703–04 (while noting that the pro-
ponents of “original meaning” seemed to have “carried the day,” “recourse to 
original intentions is more consonant with the values underlying the originalist 
approach to interpretation”). 
 6 As elaborated by Professor Richard Fallon, 
One helpful division distinguishes between ‘specific’ or ‘con-
crete’ and ‘general’ or ‘abstract’ intent. Specific intent involves 
the relatively precise intent of the framers to control the out-
comes of particular types of cases . . . . Abstract intent refers to 
aims that are defined at a higher level of generality, sometimes 
entailing consequences that the drafters did not specifically 
consider and that they might even have disapproved. 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional In-
terpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1198–99 (1987). Professor Ronald 
Dworkin has made the same point using the terms “conceptions” to describe the 
specific, discrete ideas or examples held by individuals, while “concepts” are the 
broader, more abstract idea reflected in the conceptions. RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE 70–71 (1986). For further discussion, see CHARLES D. KELSO & 
R. RANDALL KELSO, THE PATH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.2.3.2, at 156–59 
(updated 2017 ed. 2007), available at http://libguides.stcl.edu/ld.php?con-
tent_id=36280424. 
 7 In considering constitutional text, as in considering statutory text, a judge 
must decide whether to read only the text literally, and thus risk missing the spirit, 
or purpose, behind why the text was adopted, or whether to interpret the provision 
in light of both its letter and spirit. Justice Holmes once wrote, “[T]he general 
purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or 
formal logic may lay down.” United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905) 
(citation omitted). Professor Lon Fuller once asked, “[I]s it really ever possible to 
interpret a word in a statute without knowing the aim of the statute?” Lon L. 
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630, 664 (1958). On the other hand, it has been noted that purposes are elu-
sive, and that judges may see purposes in the text that reflect the judge’s own 
views, rather than the views of the drafters. See R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Con-
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In most cases, the result would be the same under either an orig-
inal intent or an original meaning approach.8 For this reason, as Jus-
tice Scalia acknowledged, “[T]he Great Divide with regard to con-
stitutional interpretation is not that between Framers’ intent and ob-
jective meaning, but rather that between original meaning (whether 
                                                                                                             
stitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional Inter-
pretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U.L. REV. 121, 129 (1994). Sup-
porters of literal interpretation are concerned that attempting to determine a pro-
vision’s purpose, or purposes, is not a clear, mechanical process that can yield 
unambiguous results. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 532–
34 (1988); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Le-
gal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1627 (1991). 
In terms of interpretation theories prevalent when the Constitution was drafted, it 
has been noted, 
[T]he over-all purpose of a document was stated carefully in 
general terms; details were put in, only where, for some partic-
ular reason, details seem required; and the rest was left to the 
rules of interpretation customarily followed by the courts. [This 
mode of interpretation was] calculated to give a just and well-
rounded interpretation to every document, in the light of its de-
clared general purpose; or, if its purpose is not declared, then, 
in the light of its apparent purpose, so far as this could be dis-
covered. 
WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, 1 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 364 (1953). See also H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 949, 952–64 
(1993); Stephen F. Williams, Rule and Purpose in Legal Interpretation, 61 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 809, 809–11 (1990); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of 
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 383–84 (1985). For further discussion of 
literal versus purposive interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 6.2.12, 
at 140–43. 
 8 In a few cases, there can be an important difference. For example, from an 
originalist approach focused on specific historical intent, the overruling of Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), may well have been flawed since segregated schools existed in 1868, even 
in the District of Columbia. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 4, at 117–27, 363–72 
(specific historical intent should be determinative, and Brown’s overruling of 
Plessy is unjustified). But see infra note 109 (noting debate over whether Brown’s 
overruling of Plessy is consistent with specific historical intent). From an original 
meaning perspective, Justice Scalia indicated his view that the clear text of the 
Equal Protection Clause requires a color-blind Constitution that overrides specific 
historical traditions, thus supporting the Court’s overruling of Plessy in Brown. 
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 n.1 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined 
by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
2017] CONTRA SCALIA, THOMAS, & GORSUCH 117 
 
derived from Framers’ intent or not) and current meaning.”9 This is 
the issue on whether to adopt a static or living model for constitu-
tional interpretation.10 
What is often unappreciated in addressing this question is the 
complication that emerges if one concludes that the framing and rat-
ifying generation believed in the model of a living Constitution. Un-
der such a model, later legislative, executive, or social practice, or 
judicial precedents, can change the meaning of a constitutional pro-
vision.11 This is true whether one adopts an original subjective intent 
or original meaning approach. In either case, it would be faithful to 
their theory of interpretation to interpret the Constitution today dif-
ferently than they would have interpreted it years ago. In short, while 
it has been noted that standard originalist supporters share the prem-
ise that “the original meaning (‘communicative content’) of the con-
stitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and rat-
ified,”12 interpretation according to any version of originalism does 
not commit the interpreter to a static or fixed interpretation of the 
Constitution. Instead, a true originalist form of interpretation can in-
corporate the principle that the provision was capable of evolution 
over time. 
Part II of this Article summarizes the four main judicial deci-
sion-making styles that exist regarding constitutional interpretation. 
Part III then summarizes the argument that the overwhelming his-
torical evidence suggests that the framers and ratifiers believed in a 
living Constitution model of interpretation. Thus, when Justices 
Scalia and Thomas adopted, or newly-confirmed Justice Neil Gor-
such potentially adopts, a static or fixed approach to constitutional 
interpretation that seeks to determine how the framers and ratifiers 
would have decided the case in 1789 (or 1791 for the Bill of Rights, 
                                                                                                             
 9 SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38. 
 10 See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. 
REV. 693, 693–95 (1976). See also infra text accompanying notes 11–12, 24–28; 
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 165–66 (discussing differences between “static” 
and “living” constitutional interpretation). 
 11 See infra text accompanying notes 52, 60–62, 87–149; KELSO & KELSO, 
supra note 6, at 159–65; Colby & Smith, supra note 1, at 244–45. 
 12 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 456 (2013). 
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or 1868 for the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process or Equal Pro-
tection Clauses),13 they are not following either the historically valid 
original intent or original meaning of the Constitution. A “true 
originalist” model of interpretation would focus on how the framers 
and ratifiers intended the meaning of the words they used to evolve 
over time in response to later legislative, executive and social prac-
tice, and judicial precedents, i.e., how the framers and ratifiers 
would interpret the Constitution if they were alive today. 
Without historical support for the standard version of original-
ism, which adopts a fixed or static model of constitutional interpre-
tation, its proponents are left with only the argument that such an 
approach is better, even if it was not shared by the framers and rati-
fiers.14 Part IV of this Article discusses the arguments why such 
standard originalism should not be preferred on normative grounds. 
Part V provides a brief conclusion and notes that the proper ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation on both original intent and 
normative grounds is to interpret the Constitution in the manner that 
the framers and ratifiers would expect it to be interpreted today.15 
That approach is best reflected on the modern Supreme Court in the 
interpretation approach of Justice Kennedy, and former Justices 
O’Connor and Souter.16 Such an approach represents what this Ar-
ticle calls a “true originalist” interpretation. 
                                                                                                             
 13 Justice Scalia made very clear his preference for a “static” or “fixed” con-
stitutional interpretation based on “original meaning.” See SCALIA, supra note 5, 
at 38–39. Concerning Justice Thomas’ theory of interpretation, see Bradley P. 
Jacob, Will the Real Constitutional Originalist Please Stand Up?, 40 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 595, 649 (2007) (arguing that Justice Thomas is even more of a committed 
originalist than Justice Scalia). Regarding Justice Gorsuch, see Max Alderman & 
Duncan Pickard, Justice Scalia’s Heir Apparent?: Judge Gorsuch’s Approach to 
Textualism and Originalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 185, 185 (2017). 
 14 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 91, 102–17 (2004). See also infra text accompanying 
notes 179–82. 
 15 This approach is consistent with Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why 
and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 540 (2013) (discussing “authorially in-
tended meaning”); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Re-
demption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 442–54 (2007) (discussing the difference 
between “original meaning,” which is consistent with a living Constitution model 
of interpretation, and “original expected application,” which reflects fixed or 
static meaning). 
 16 See infra text accompanying notes 102–05, 86, 124–29, 144–49. 
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II.  THE FOUR STYLES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
As is discussed more in-depth elsewhere,17 jurisprudentially, 
there are two main questions that lie behind any act of judicial inter-
pretation. The first concerns the nature of law: analytic versus func-
tional.18 The second concerns the nature of the judicial task: positiv-
ist versus normative.19 Combining the two responses to these two 
                                                                                                             
 17 This discussion in Part II is an abbreviated version of material presented in 
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 19–62, 99–133. 
 18 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 35. Under one approach, law is seen 
primarily as a set of rules and principles whose application is guided by an ana-
lytic methodology of logic and reason, i.e., the analytic, or conceptualist, ap-
proach. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND 
METHOD OF THE LAW 95–99 (rev. ed. 1974). Alternatively, law ultimately can be 
judged not in terms of logical consistency, but as a means to some social end 
through a pragmatic or functional treatment of rules and principles, i.e., the func-
tional, or pragmatic, approach. Id. at 111–33. 
[L]egal ordering [under an analytic approach] is not the collec-
tive pursuit of a desirable purpose. Instead, it is the specification 
of the norms and principles immanent to juridically intelligible 
relationships. [This approach] repudiates analysis that con-
ceives of legal justification in terms of some goal that is inde-
pendent of the conceptual structure of the legal arrangement in 
question. 
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 
YALE L.J. 949, 964–65 (1988). 
The dominant tendency today [under a functional approach] is 
to look upon the content of law from the standpoint of some 
external ideal that the law is to enforce or make authoritative. 
Implicit in contemporary scholarship is the idea that the law 
embodies or should embody some goal (e.g., wealth maximiza-
tion, market deterrence, liberty, utility, solidarity) that can be 
specified apart from law and can serve as the standard by which 
law is to be assessed. 
Id. at 955 (footnotes omitted). 
 19 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 35. This question asks whether judi-
cial decision-making should be separable from morals or social values, i.e., should 
judges view law solely as a body of rules and principles from which legal conclu-
sions are derived—the positivist assumption—or should judges view law as a 
body of rules and principles testable by reference to some external standard of 
rightness, some social or moral value – law as normative or prescriptive, not de-
scriptive. See BODENHEIMER, supra note 18, at 91–109, 134–68. A judge could 
aim at producing decisions and opinions that are “good law” in the narrow sense 
of being clear, certain, and predictable, and unquestionably within the legitimate 
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questions creates four judicial decision-making styles: formalism 
(analytic positivism); Holmesian (functional positivism); instru-
mentalism (functional normative); and natural law (analytic norma-
tive).20 
Focusing on constitutional interpretation, any interpreter must 
decide, among other things, how much weight to give to arguments 
about: (1) the plain meaning of the Constitution’s text, and the text’s 
purpose or spirit; (2) the context of that text, including verbal or pol-
icy maxims of construction, related provisions in the Constitution or 
other related documents, like the earlier enacted Articles of Confed-
eration, and the structure of government contemplated by the Con-
stitution, including issues of federalism and separation of powers; 
(3) the historical evidence concerning the intent of the framers and 
ratifiers of the Constitution; (4) the legislative, executive, and social 
practice under the Constitution; (5) the judicial precedent interpret-
ing the Constitution; and (6) the prudential considerations about the 
consequences of a particular judicial decision.21 
                                                                                                             
power of the court. Such judges are typically described as following a “positivist” 
approach to judicial decision-making. See Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Pos-
itivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797, 799–802 (1993). In contrast, a judge could aim at 
producing law and applications of law that accord with certain moral principles 
embedded in a society’s legal and moral culture. Judges adopting this more “nor-
mative” perspective view the judge’s role as requiring the judge to give some 
weight to the moral insights and traditions that lie behind legal rules and that may 
develop over time. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 
1063 (1975) (“[W]hat an individual is entitled to have, in civil society, depends 
upon both the practice and the justice of its political institutions.”). 
 20 See infra text accompanying notes 25–48; KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, 
at 35–62. See also R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and 
the Four Main Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal 
History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 150, 184–218 (1994); R. Randall Kelso, Statu-
tory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctrinal 
Approaches to Judicial Decision-making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 40 (1997). 
 21 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 5.1, at 99–100. A similar set of 
sources for constitutional interpretation—text, including context; history; struc-
ture/theory; precedent and practices; and prudential/value considerations—ap-
pears in RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 3–12 
(2001); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Overcoming the Constitution, 91 GEO. L.J. 407, 
409 n.11 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE 
CONSTITUTION (2001)); See also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: 
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9–119 (1982) (discussing arguments of text, struc-
ture, history, doctrine (precedent), and prudential and ethical considerations). 
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These sources—text, context/structure, history, practice, prece-
dent, and prudential considerations—can be organized under two 
broad headings: contemporaneous sources of meaning and subse-
quent considerations.22 Contemporaneous sources are those that ex-
isted at the time a constitutional provision was ratified.23 These in-
clude: (1) the text of the Constitution; (2) the context of that text, 
including related provisions in the Constitution or other related doc-
uments, and the structure of government contemplated by the Con-
stitution; and (3) the history surrounding the provision’s drafting 
and ratification.24 Subsequent considerations involve matters that 
occur after the constitutional provision is ratified.25 These include 
the sub-categories of: (4) legislative, executive, and social practice 
under the Constitution; (5) judicial precedent interpreting the Con-
stitution; and (6) prudential considerations, which involve judicial 
speculation concerning the consequences of any particular judicial 
construction, including arguments of justice or sound social pol-
icy.26 Naturally, use in constitutional interpretation of such subse-
quent sources leads to a living Constitution, which changes over 
time. As Justice Scalia once remarked, “[t]he ascendant school of 
constitutional interpretation affirms the existence of what is called 
The Living Constitution, a body of law that . . . grows and changes 
from age to age . . . .”27 
As is discussed below,28 in terms of the four judicial decision-
making styles, from a fixed or static approach to constitutional in-
terpretation, typically adopted by formalists, judges should resort 
only to contemporaneous sources of interpretation, i.e., (1)–(3) 
listed above; Holmesian judges will place greater reliance on (4) 
legislative and executive practice; natural law judges will place 
                                                                                                             
 22 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, §§ 5.1–5.3, at 99–125. 
 23 See id. § 5.1, at 100. 
 24 See id. The term “contemporaneous sources” conforms to usage by Justice 
Powell in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568 (1985) 
(Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“As contem-
poraneous writings and the debates at the ratifying conventions make clear, the 
States’ ratification of the Constitution was predicated on this understand-
ing . . . .”). 
 25 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 5.1, at 100. 
 26 See id. 
 27 SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38. 
 28 See infra text accompanying notes 31–71. 
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greater reliance on a reasoned elaboration of (5) judicial precedents; 
and instrumentalist judges will be willing to resort to (6) prudential 
considerations of social policy.29 
A.  Formalist Constitutional Decision-Making 
One approach to judicial decision-making is represented by an-
alytic, positivist judges who combine a focus on certain, predictable 
treatment of existing positive law with an insistence on logical rule 
application.30 Such judges have generally been called “formalists” 
because they concentrate on the formal aspects of law––technical 
rule manipulation in light of a statute’s or constitution’s words, and 
the literal holdings of common-law precedents.31 Under a positivist 
theory of law, the formalist sees the judge as a neutral arbitrator who 
attempts to decide cases in light of existing positive law.32 With an 
analytic, positivist theory of law, formalism has a preference for 
clear, bright-line rules that are capable of logical, mechanical appli-
cation, rather than doctrine phrased as balancing tests, factors to 
weigh, or general standards.33 
                                                                                                             
 29 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 6.4.4, at 171. 
 30 See id. § 3.1, at 35. 
 31 Id. Under this approach, law is viewed as a closed system of related rules 
to be logically or mechanically applied. See generally Roscoe Pound, Mechanical 
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 607–09, 614–20 (1908). It has been noted, 
“Formalists generally viewed the law as a relatively closed system of conceptions 
and axioms from which judges and others could deduce resolutions of almost any 
issue.” Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century 
American Legal Thought – A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General 
Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861, 889–90 (1981) (citing 
Pound, supra). The formalist approach to statutory and constitutional interpreta-
tion similarly focuses on the logical elaboration of existing statutory or constitu-
tional text. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 39–41 nn.14–22. 
 32 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 40. See also Schauer, supra note 7, 
at 521 (“To be formalistic, it is said, is to be enslaved by mere marks on a printed 
page.”) (footnote omitted). See generally Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 527, 527 (1999). 
 33 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 40. See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule 
of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–88 (1989). 
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This emphasis on deciding according to existing positive law 
supports formalist judges adopting a static or fixed view of consti-
tutional interpretation.34 However, as Justice Scalia noted, this ap-
proach does not necessarily adopt a strict, or narrow, construction of 
constitutional provisions.35 Indeed, Justice Scalia stated, “[This] is 
not strict construction, but it is reasonable construction.”36 The term 
“textualism” is not used in this Article to describe this interpretation 
style because all four judicial decision-making styles start their stat-
utory and constitutional analysis with text.37 In any event, Justice 
Scalia embraced the term “formalism,” as he emphatically asserted, 
Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the 
most mindless is that it is “formalistic.” The answer 
to that is, of course it’s formalistic! The rule of law 
is about form . . . Long live formalism. It is what 
makes a government a government of laws and not 
of men.38 
B.  Holmesian Constitutional Decision-Making 
A second kind of judge combines a positivist emphasis on cer-
tain, predictable treatments of existing law with the functional view 
that legal rules are always means to societal ends.39 Given this view 
of legal rules, purely logical treatment of existing law is not suffi-
cient to carry out the judicial task.40 Judges who adopt this view may 
be called “Holmesians” after Justice Holmes, whose famous state-
ment was that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience.”41 As pragmatic functionalists, Holmesian judges are 
sensitive to the purposes behind relevant legal rules and texts to ap-
ply the doctrine in a way best calculated to achieve its intended 
                                                                                                             
 34 See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38–41, 45–47. 
 35 See id. at 38–39. 
 36 Id. at 38. 
 37 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 39. 
 38 SCALIA, supra note 5, at 25. For further treatment of the formalist approach 
to constitutional interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 278–302. 
 39 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 41. 
 40 See id. 
 41 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). See also 
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 41. 
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ends.42 However, as positivists, Holmesian judges believe that the 
judicial task is merely to interpret existing law, with any changes in 
the law coming from the other branches of government, the legisla-
tive or executive branch.43 As Holmes stated, “[t]he first require-
ment of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the 
actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or 
wrong.”44 
Given this understanding, the role of the law in Holmes’ view 
was to accommodate what the dominant group in society wants.45 
Indeed, as Professor G. Edward White noted, 
Holmes’ job at the Supreme Court consisted of, in 
many instances, reviewing the constitutionality of 
actions of a legislature. In such cases Holmes forged 
his famous attitude of deference, which was seen as 
humility and ‘self-restraint’ by admirers and had the 
added advantage of sustaining ‘progressive’ legisla-
tion about which a number of early 20th-century in-
tellectuals were enthusiastic . . . . [I]n the 1950’s and 
1960’s a similar version of deference would have 
perpetuated malapportioned legislatures, racially 
segregated facilities, the absence of legal representa-
tion for impoverished persons, and restrictions on the 
use and dispensation of birth control devices.46 
Professor Grant Gilmore noted that for Holmes, “if the dominant 
majority . . . desires to persecute blacks or Jews or communists or 
atheists, the law, if it is to be ‘sound,’ must arrange for the persecu-
tion to be carried out with, as we might say, due process.”47 
                                                                                                             
 42 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 41. 
 43 See id. 
 44 HOLMES, supra note 41, at 41. 
 45 See G. Edward White, The Integrity of Holmes’ Jurisprudence, 10 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 633, 657 (1982) (“While a constitution was ‘made for people 
of fundamentally differing views,’ the views that counted were those of the ma-
jority.”) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting)). 
 46 Id. at 655, 667 (footnote omitted). On this aspect of Holmes’ jurisprudence, 
see Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 
254, 254 (1963). 
 47 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 49–50 (1977). 
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For these reasons, the Holmesian deference-to-government ap-
proach is the style most properly viewed as a strict construction ap-
proach to the Constitution, at least in cases involving individual 
rights challenges to the constitutionality of governmental action.48 
For structural issues of federalism or separation of powers, a defer-
ence-to-government approach does not call for strict construction of 
governmental powers, but rather for a deferential approach toward 
governmental powers.49 This deference-to-government posture 
means that Holmesian judges are the most willing to permit legisla-
tive and executive action to act as a gloss on meaning to the Consti-
tution.50 To this extent, the Holmesian approach rejects a static 
model of constitutional interpretation in favor of a living Constitu-
tion.51 This is true so long as that living Constitution derives its sup-
port from legislative or executive action, rather than judicial consid-
eration of general moral principles or social policy.52 
C.  Instrumentalist Constitutional Decision-Making 
The instrumentalist approach to constitutional interpretation in-
volves resorting to background moral principles and social policies 
in cases where leeway exists in the law following consideration of 
the text and purpose of constitutional provisions.53 Because of the 
                                                                                                             
 48 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 46. See also White, supra note 
45, at 656–58. 
 49 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 46. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 986–87, 994–96 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (legislative and executive 
practice should override text of Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses to make 
a legislative veto provision constitutional). 
 50 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 46. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id.; see, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 694–96, 704–06 (supporting 
Justice Holmes’ approach toward a “living” Constitution model of interpretation); 
Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist Theory of Legal Interpretation, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 603–06 (2013). For further treatment of the Holmesian 
approach to constitutional interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, 
§ 10.1, at 303. 
 53 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 3.3, at 47–48. See, e.g., STEPHEN 
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 6–
12, 115–32 (2005); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1, 1–8 (1996); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 
MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1343–47 (1988) (comparing, inter alia, Ronald Dworkin’s 
natural law theory, which permits use of background “principles” to aid interpre-
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general nature of many constitutional provisions, such as due pro-
cess, equal protection, or freedom of speech, a greater percentage of 
constitutional cases tend to involve more leeway than in the case of 
statutory interpretation.54 Followed faithfully, however, the instru-
mentalist approach to constitutional interpretation is not an invita-
tion to unbridled judicial activism.55 For example, Justice Brennan 
once noted that he grounded his approach to the Constitution in 
terms of a concern with “human dignity” shared by the framers and 
ratifiers of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
thus part of the Constitution’s background context, not his personal 
views.56 Nevertheless, because of the potential for greater judicial 
activism represented by the instrumentalist approach, instrumental-
ist judges are most often criticized for deciding cases based on 
grounds that the decision reflects a supposed community consensus, 
or values a judge thinks the community eventually will hold, or a 
“judge’s own values.”57 Instrumentalist judges are thus often de-
scribed as judicial activists by their detractors.58 
Because even a moderate instrumentalist judge considers actual 
background social policies of contemporary society as one source of 
constitutional interpretation, the instrumentalist approach rejects the 
formalist model of a static or dead Constitution.59 Instead, the in-
strumentalist approach favors a living Constitution that draws its 
breath not only from the text and purpose of the framing and ratify-
                                                                                                             
tation, versus pragmatism’s additional use of social “policies”). For further dis-
cussion of principles versus policies, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 2.4, at 
30–34. 
 54 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 3.3, at 47–48. 
 55 See id. at 53. 
 56 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contempo-
rary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 439–45 (1986). 
 57 John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, Foreword: On Discovering 
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 16–22, 43–52 (1978). 
 58 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 69–100 (1990); BERGER, supra note 4, at 288–99; LOUIS 
LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT’S POWER 
TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 273–310 (1975). See also JOHN DENTON CARTER, 
THE WARREN COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM ix–xii (1973). 
 59 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 54. 
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ing generation, but also from the history and traditions of contem-
porary society.60 Unlike the Holmesian deference-to-government 
approach, the instrumentalist approach does not limit this living 
Constitution to support from positive governmental action—that is, 
recent action of the legislative and executive branches.61 Instead, the 
living Constitution embodies many sources, including contempo-
rary social views in America and Western civilization generally, re-
cent judicial precedents, and prudential consideration by judges of 
contemporary social policy.62 
D.  Natural Law Constitutional Decision-Making 
Societies typically have positive legal enactments—constitu-
tions, statutes, and a record of prior judicial decisions—and in de-
ciding cases, natural law judges, like all other judges, will examine 
those enactments very carefully.63 Regarding constitutional inter-
pretation, however, judges in the natural law decision-making tradi-
tion will be quite careful to ask whether the drafters included natural 
law principles in the Constitution.64 As Dean Roscoe Pound ob-
served in 1938, “In studying the formative era of American law we 
are concerned immediately with the eighteenth-century natural law 
which became embodied for us in the Declaration of Independence 
                                                                                                             
 60 See id.; see, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Con-
stitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 245, 247–50 (2002). 
 61 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 54. 
 62 See id.; see, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 388–90 (1989) 
(Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (“Where 
organizations with expertise in a relevant area have given careful consideration to 
the question . . . there is no reason why that judgment should not be entitled to 
attention as an indicator of contemporary standards,” and these standards might 
involve legislative enactments or views of social organizations “in other coun-
tries” as part of an evolving consensus among nations), abrogated by Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Bor-
ders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 329 (2004); Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 265 (2003); For further treatment of the instru-
mentalist approach to constitutional interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra 
note 6, at 325–53. 
 63 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 3.4, at 55. 
 64 See id. 
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and is behind our bills of rights.”65 Natural law thinkers might also 
take natural law principles into account in passing statutes.66 As 
Dean Pound noted, 
[T]he believers in eighteenth-century natural law did 
great things in the development of American law be-
cause that theory gave faith that they could do them. 
Application of reason to the details of the received 
common law was what made the work of the legisla-
tive reform movement of enduring worth. Some of 
its best achievements were in formulating authorita-
tively what men had reasoned out in the era of the 
school of the law of nature in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.67 
It must be acknowledged that certain more radical versions of 
natural law theory may be as willing as versions of instrumentalism 
to let moral principles outside those natural law principles reflected 
in the Constitution affect constitutional interpretation.68 On the other 
hand, the natural law theory of our constitutional tradition, as es-
poused by Chief Justice John Marshall, Justice Joseph Story, James 
Madison, and others during the framing and ratifying period, held 
that judges should consider only the background moral principles 
that emerge from considering the Constitution.69 This flows from 
viewing the natural law philosophy of our framers and ratifiers as 
primarily influenced by Enlightenment natural law theory, and the 
Enlightenment’s social contract conception of the nature of govern-
ment and the proper role of the judiciary in such a society to follow 
                                                                                                             
 65 ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 17 (photo. re-
print 1960) (1938). 
 66 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 55. 
 67 POUND, supra note, 65, at 27. 
 68 This possibility is discussed infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra text accompanying notes 89–101. For an example of the Marshall 
Court following principles in the Constitution itself, rather than background nat-
ural law, and thus being unwilling to hold slavery was unconstitutional under the 
original Constitution despite its evident immorality from the perspective of natu-
ral law, see Donald M. Roper, In Quest of Judicial Objectivity: The Marshall 
Court and the Legitimation of Slavery, 21 STAN. L. REV. 532, 533–34 (1969). 
2017] CONTRA SCALIA, THOMAS, & GORSUCH 129 
 
the social contract as set out in a written Constitution.70 It is im-
portant to remember, however, that the Ninth Amendment is a tex-
tual reminder that the framers and ratifiers believed citizens retained 
rights not enumerated in the Constitution, thus supporting the mod-
ern constitutional doctrine of “unenumerated” fundamental rights.71 
III.  HISTORICAL EVIDENCE SURROUNDING THE APPROACH OF 
THE FRAMERS AND RATIFIERS 
A.  General Observations 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, virtually all discus-
sion and writing about law and theories of interpretation approached 
the topic from the perspective of some version of natural law.72 As 
                                                                                                             
 70 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 55–56. Professor Kermit Hall has 
noted: “Natural law theory and the social contract gave American public law its 
emphasis on limiting governmental power. If government violated the social con-
tract and if it denied natural rights and abused public trust, the people retained a 
right to overthrow it.” KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 58 (1989). See also Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Con-
stitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 133–37 (1989) (concluding that we do not have 
an unwritten Constitution, and that judges should only resort to principles in the 
Constitution itself). 
 71 On this natural law background, see David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights 
Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor McAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
313, 313–19 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Consti-
tution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1987). See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, 
at 1044 (discussing the text of the Ninth Amendment, which provides: “The enu-
meration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”). For further treatment of the natural law 
approach to constitutional interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 
278–302. 
 72 The discussion in Section III.A of this Article is an updated, and shortened, 
version of an earlier work by this author. See R. Randall Kelso, The Natural Law 
Tradition on the Modern Supreme Court: Not Burke, but the Enlightenment Tra-
dition Represented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1051, 
1053–56, 1074–79 (1995). See also DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 367–83 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the 
natural law tradition of Locke, Pufendorf, Vattel, Burlamaqui, and Grotius, among 
others); Andrew Tutt, Treaty Textualism, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 292–309 
(2014) (discussing the interpretation theories of Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf, Burla-
maqui, Rutherforth, Bacon, and Blackstone, among others); Edward S. Corwin, 
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this Article discusses,73 the traditional eighteenth-century natural 
law model of interpretation treated repeated legislative or executive 
practice, or a reasoned elaboration of precedent, as relevant to con-
stitutional meaning, in addition to text, context, purpose, and his-
tory. In considering constitutional interpretation actions after a con-
stitutional provision was ratified, the framers’ and ratifiers’ genera-
tion necessarily rejected a static or fixed version of constitutional 
interpretation. 
As is discussed below,74 there were two competing approaches 
in the eighteenth century to which the framing and ratifying gener-
ation would have turned for guidance: the classic/Christian natural 
law tradition and the Enlightenment natural law tradition. Under the 
classic/Christian tradition, the ultimate source of rights is God’s rea-
son and will.75 Under the Enlightenment tradition, the ultimate 
source of natural rights is based upon human reason.76 This led to 
placing a high value on freedom of speech and religious toleration, 
and it supported a belief in “civil peace, material prosperity through 
economic growth, scientific progress, and rational liberty.”77 
                                                                                                             
The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. 
REV. 149, 157 (1928). 
 73 See supra note 7; infra text accompanying notes 113–40, 159–94. For fur-
ther discussion on the basic elements of this natural law approach see KELSO & 
KELSO, supra note 6, at 354–404. 
 74 See generally infra text accompanying notes 75–84; Kelso, supra note 72, 
at 1053–56. 
 75 As has been noted, this tradition is “classical and Christian, in the tradition 
of Cicero, Aquinas, Hooker, and Burke.” JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 69 (2d prtg. 1990). See generally DOUGLAS W. 
KMIEC, ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES, AND 
PHILOSOPHY 1 (3d ed. 2009) (analyzing “constitutional law by considering a num-
ber of ideas from early thinkers which have been influential in the forging of the 
American constitutional order”). 
 76 See Kelso, supra note 72, at 1055 (“[T]he Enlightenment . . . tradition is 
‘characterized by its rationalism, secularism, and radicalism . . . . [and] rejected 
the divine origin of natural law, exalt[ing] the autonomy of human reason’ . . . .”) 
(quoting MCCLELLAN, supra note 75, at 70–71). 
 77 ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 
(1985). The Enlightenment natural law tradition includes the English, Scottish, 
and French Enlightenments. This seventeenth-to-eighteenth-century tradition in-
cluded such writers as Locke and Berkeley of the English Enlightenment; Hutch-
enson, Hume, and Adam Smith of the Scottish Enlightenment; and Montesquieu, 
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Determining the precise influences on the framers and ratifiers 
at the time of the founding is likely to be somewhat controversial.78 
This is particularly true among aspects of the eighteenth century nat-
ural law Enlightenment tradition.79 Similar debates can be made re-
                                                                                                             
Rousseau, and Voltaire of the French Enlightenment. See William Bristow, En-
lightenment, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2017 Edi-
tion), available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/. Under these 
approaches, rights derive from man and man’s reason. Id. (noting the Enlighten-
ment is sometimes called “the Age of Reason”). As Professor Jefferson Powell 
has noted, the Enlightenment tradition of rational liberty is based on an “under-
standing of human nature as constituted by ‘basic deliberative capacities’ and by 
the potential for ‘some measure of self-direction.’ On that basis, liberalism pur-
sues ‘the preservation and enhancement of human capacities for understanding 
and reflective self-direction’ as ‘the core of the liberal political and moral vision.’” 
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 225 (1993) (quoting 
SMITH, supra, at 200–01). 
 78 For example, as between the Enlightenment tradition and the classi-
cal/Christian natural law tradition, the seventeenth and eighteenth-century civic 
Republican tradition is probably best viewed as more part of the Enlightenment 
tradition. As has been noted, 
[w]hile some advocates of the civic republican interpretation of 
the founding view republicanism as antithetical to liberalism, 
republicanism is better understood as a possible historical com-
plement to liberalism . . . . Even those whose commitment to 
Enlightenment politics was the most undeniable [citing James 
Madison, among others] saw no inconsistency in invoking the 
necessity of [the civic Republican concept of] civic virtue to 
free government as well. 
POWELL, supra note 77, at 67, 69 (footnotes omitted). See also Suzanna Sherry, 
Public Values and Private Virtue, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1099, 1099–1104 (1994) 
(complementary nature of civic Republicanism and liberalism); Stephen M. Feld-
man, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 679, 688–90 
(1992) (discussing Locke and various versions of civil republicanism). 
 79 For example, there is a debate over whether the framers and ratifiers were 
influenced more by Lockean or civic Republican ideology. Professor Mark Tush-
net has noted: 
The liberal [Lockean] tradition stresses the self-interested mo-
tivations of individuals [sometimes called possessive individu-
alism] and treats the collective good as the aggregation of what 
individuals choose . . . . Although it acknowledges the role of 
public institutions in providing the framework for individual 
development, the liberal tradition insists that such institutions 
be neutral toward competing conceptions of the good and tends 
132 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:112 
 
garding events leading up to the drafting and ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and 
Equal Protection clauses.80 
                                                                                                             
to emphasize the risks of governmental overreaching. The re-
publican tradition, seeing public institutions as important means 
by which private character is shaped, is less suspicious of gov-
ernment. 
MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6 (1988). As this discussion suggests, and Professor Tush-
net noted, “[A]s the framers considered questions of fundamental institutional de-
sign, they discovered that liberalism and civic republicanism converged on some 
important matters.” Id. at 7. For a more recent discussion of the similarities and 
differences between Lockean and civil Republican ideology, see Jack M. Balkin, 
Which Republican Constitution?, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 31, 31–36, 44–55 (2017) 
(reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING 
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016)). 
  There are also debates over the influence on the framers and ratifiers of the 
Scottish versus the English Enlightenment. For example, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence phrased “unalienable” rights as rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness,” reflecting the “moral sense” of the Scottish Enlightenment of Frances 
Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, and their view of “sympathy,” rather 
than “life, liberty, and property,” thus reflecting the focus of Locke and the Eng-
lish Enlightenment. See generally GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: 
JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 168–80 (1978); GARRY WILLS, 
EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 66–71 (1981); Robert G. Natelson, A 
Reminder: The Constitutional Values of Sympathy and Independence, 91 KY. L.J. 
353, 358–82 (2003). The Scottish Enlightenment was closer in this manner to the 
civic Republican tradition, and the French Enlightenment’s phrasing of “liberty, 
equality, and fraternity.” The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, of 
course, adopted the Lockean concept that no person may be deprived of “life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.” This phrasing was also used in 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1. However, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), a founda-
tional case for the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process doctrine, the 
Court concluded “liberty” includes “those privileges long recognized at common 
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,” invoking the 
Scottish Enlightenment phrasing. On these varied influences, see ALAN GIBSON, 
INTERPRETING THE FOUNDING: GUIDE TO THE ENDURING DEBATES OVER THE 
ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC ix (2006). 
 80 For example, there could have been debates over the influence of Adam 
Smith or John Locke during the pre-Civil War period leading up to the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 13.1, at 405–
09 nn. 5–16 (citing, inter alia, MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 1–9 (1977)). Further, there can be a debate sur-
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However, any specific substantive disagreements among the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural law approaches are not 
critical from a focus on static versus living constitutional interpreta-
tion, as each viewed natural rights as an evolutionary project of 
greater, and a more enlightened, understanding of the demands of 
reason as applied to human nature.81 That more precise understand-
ing would lead all of these traditions toward a convergence of their 
views based on that new understanding.82 Further, each viewed con-
stitutional interpretation as intended to carry out the purposes of the 
framers and ratifiers, with those purposes influenced by the natural 
law tradition and an expectation that the then-current natural law 
style of drafting documents would be understood and applied so that 
courts would interpret legislation and the Constitution in light of that 
tradition.83 While that model likely adopted more of an objective 
original meaning approach toward interpretation, rather than a sub-
jective original intent,84 whether the focus is on the framers’ intent 
                                                                                                             
rounding the influence of classic/Christian versus Enlightenment natural law rea-
soning in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly as it affected the 
Federalist, Democratic, Whig, Republican, and other political parties. See KELSO 
& KELSO, supra note 6, § 8.4.1, at 262–63 nn. 66–71, 265–66 nn. 85–88. See also 
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 72, at 361–67 (discussing the ideological origins 
of the Reconstruction amendments). 
 81 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 8.4.1, at 270. 
 82 See id. For discussion of the elements of that developed understanding of 
the requirements of moral reason, and their similarity to foundational religious 
moral principles such as “love of neighbor as thyself,” see infra notes 216–26 and 
accompanying text; KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 505–48. See also R. Randall 
Kelso, Modern Moral Reasoning and Emerging Trends in Constitutional and 
Other Rights Decision-Making Around the World, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 433, 
434–40 (2011). 
 83 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 270. See also supra note 7; infra text 
accompanying notes 84–149. 
 84 See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 8–12 (1991); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 887–902 (1985). For 
example, the prevailing mode of interpretation in the United States and England 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century took the view that it was im-
proper to consider the legislative history of a provision to help determine its mean-
ing. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 6.2.3.1, at 150. Thus, notes of the Con-
stitutional Convention, or statements made on the floor of the House and Senate 
during consideration of the first ten amendments, were not proper to consider, 
while contemporaneous statements about the meaning of the Constitution that 
were not part of the formal legislative history, but were part of the public dialogue 
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at the Constitutional Convention, the ratifiers’ intent at the state rat-
ifying conventions, or the original public meaning, all adopted a nat-
ural law approach toward interpretation.85 
Both the classical/Christian and Enlightenment natural law tra-
ditions, in whatever version, shared many aspects of the common-
law methodology of judicial decision-making.86 The eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century natural law judicial decision-making tradition 
utilized a wide range of arguments regarding constitutional interpre-
tation, including “considerations of constitutional text, purpose, and 
structure; the history of the framing and ratifying period; subsequent 
judicial precedents; and subsequent legislative and executive prac-
tices under the Constitution,” which were held to constitute a gloss 
on meaning.87 Under a natural law approach, arguments of practice 
and precedent are held to constitute a gloss on meaning that alters 
what the Constitution means, consistent with a living model of con-
stitutional interpretation.88 
It has been noted that this mode of reasoning, dependent on ju-
dicial tradition, was shared by Madison on the Republican side of 
                                                                                                             
prior to ratification, like The Federalist Papers, were proper to consider. See id.; 
see generally Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some 
Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1040–43 (1991); Tutt, supra note 72, at 
299–300 (interpretation should be based on “objective” interpretation based on 
common usage of words at the time the instrument was drafted, “unless there are 
good Conjectures to the contrary.”). This limitation gradually died out during the 
nineteenth century in America. Thus, notes of the Constitutional Convention or 
House or Senate statements about constitutional amendments became proper to 
use as history to determine the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent. See Baade, supra, at 
1055–64. Early natural law opinions are thus more “textualist” than later natural 
law opinions, which involve more historical “originalism.” See GOLDSTEIN, su-
pra, at 7–12 (discussing the early textualist nature of Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinions). See also KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 6.2.1.1, at 137 n.11; 
§ 12.2.1.3, at 362–63 nn. 35–38. 
 85 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 270. 
 86 See id. See also Kelso, supra note 72, at 1057. 
 87 Kelso, supra note 72, at 1057. See also Ernest Young, Rediscovering Con-
servatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. 
L. REV. 619, 688–97 (1994); Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation 
and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283, 310–12, 
317–28, 334–49 (2014). 
 88 See infra text accompanying notes 120–29 (on legislative and executive 
practice); infra text accompanying notes 130–49 (on judicial precedents). See also 
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, §§ 12.2.2.1–12.2.2.2, at 364. 
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early American politics, and by Alexander Hamilton and Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall on the Federalist side.89 As Professor Jefferson 
Powell observed, “[Madison] consistently thought that ‘usus,’ the 
exposition of the Constitution provided by actual governmental 
practice and judicial precedents, could ‘settle its meaning and the 
intention of its authors.’”90 It has been noted: 
‘Among the obvious and just guides applicable to in-
terpreting the Constitution,’ Madison listed: 
1. The evils and defects for curing which the Consti-
tution was called for & introduced. 
2. The comments prevailing at the time it was 
adopted. 
3. The early, deliberate and continued practice under 
the Constitution, as preferable to constructions 
adapted on the spur of occasions, and subject to the 
vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies.91 
                                                                                                             
 89 See POWELL, supra note 77, at 95–100. 
 90 Powell, supra note 84, at 939 (footnotes and citations omitted). See also H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1513, 1539–42 (1987) (providing fuller treatment of Madison’s views). 
 91 David M. O’Brien, The Framers’ Muse on Republicanism, The Supreme 
Court, and Pragmatic Constitutional Interpretivism, 8 CONST. COMM. 119, 145 
(1991) (alterations and citation omitted). See also DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST 
OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY 74–76, 78–80 
(1989). Madison is also famous for stating, “I entirely concur in the propriety of 
resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the 
nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution.” Letter from James 
Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 191 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON]. See also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and 
Supermajoritarianism: Defending the Nexus, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1919, 1929 n.38 
(2007). While this quote has been used to argue that Madison favored a static form 
of originalism, see id. at 1930, this quote actually supports a living Constitution 
form of interpretation, once it is understood that the historical evidence supports 
the view that the “sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified” was 
the natural law model of interpretation. As Madison also noted, one should follow 
the “‘established rules of interpretation’ in construing that [constitutional] mean-
ing.” Id. at 1929 (citing Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren (July 5, 
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A Burkean approach to interpretation is similar. As Professor 
Ernest Young noted, “Burke placed little reliance on the original 
structure and theoretical underpinnings of institutions; rather, insti-
tutions become effective in meeting the needs of society through a 
continuing process of adaptation that may or may not be consistent 
with the original intentions of the founders[.]”92 In 1833, Justice 
Story similarly supported the practice of drawing inferences from 
congressional, executive, and state acquiescence in “more than forty 
years” of “full operation” under the Constitution, and from “the 
practical exposition of the government itself.”93 
James Madison’s views on the constitutionality of Congress au-
thorizing a national bank provides a good example of these princi-
ples at work. Based upon legislative, executive, judicial, and social 
practice, James Madison changed his position between 1791 and 
1816 on the constitutionality of Congress incorporating a national 
bank.94 Indeed, he noted in a letter to Congress in 1816 that, while 
he opposed the bank in 1791 in part on constitutional grounds, he 
now viewed a national bank as constitutional based upon “repeated 
recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an 
institution, in acts of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
                                                                                                             
1830), reprinted in WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 376. Those “estab-
lished rules” for Madison reflected consideration of purpose, history, legislative 
and executive practice, and judicial precedents (“usus”). See Powell, supra note 
84, at 939. In a similar vein, Alexander Hamilton suggested that “[t]o avoid an 
arbitrary discretion in the courts,” they should follow “rules and precedents which 
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before 
them.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). The established “rules and precedents” in the eighteenth century sup-
ported the natural law model of interpretation. Support for a social contract theory 
of government—such as in Abraham Lincoln’s famous comment, “[N]o man is 
good enough to govern another man, without that other’s consent”—is illustrative. 
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Ill. (Oct. 16, 1854), reprinted in 2 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 266 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1953). The 
Peoria Speech is also consistent with the natural law model of interpretation 
adopted in this Article. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 92 Young, supra note 87, at 664. 
 93 JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 391, 408, at 363, 392 (1833). For discussion of Story’s belief in natural 
law, see MCCLELLAN, supra note 75, at 85–86. 
 94 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 6.3.1, at 160. 
2017] CONTRA SCALIA, THOMAS, & GORSUCH 137 
 
branches of the Government, accompanied by indications, in differ-
ent modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation.”95 The 
Supreme Court emphasized legislative/executive practice and prec-
edent, stating in its opinion considering the issue in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, “[t]he principle now contested was introduced at a very 
early period of our history, has been recognised by many successive 
legislatures, and has been acted upon by the judicial department, in 
cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation.”96 
The Court also paid deference to legislative practice in other 
early cases. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Court stated, “Hence 
[the Constitution’s] powers are expressed in general terms, leaving 
to the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to ef-
fectuate legitimate objects, and to [mold] and model the exercise of 
its powers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should re-
quire.”97 In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court stated, 
If commerce does not include navigation, the gov-
ernment of the Union has no direct power over that 
subject . . . . Yet this power has been exercised from 
the commencement of the government, has been ex-
ercised with the consent of all, and has been under-
stood by all to be a commercial regulation.98 
                                                                                                             
 95 PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (5th ed. 2006) (citation omitted). For the views of 
Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, and others on the constitutionality of the national 
bank in 1791, see id. at 27–37. Alternatively, it could be argued that Madison’s 
change of heart regarding the bank’s constitutionality was based only on Madison 
changing his view on the “necessity” of the national bank, given his experience 
with the War of 1812, and thus Madison’s change was consistent with a fixed, 
static view of constitutional interpretation merely interpreting in light of new 
knowledge what was “necessary” under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See, 
e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 190–94 (2003). However, that is not the reason 
Madison gave in his letter signing the bank bill, which focused on later legislative, 
executive, judicial, and social practice, as quoted above, nor is it consistent with 
Madison’s support throughout his life that such later action (“usus”) can fix the 
meaning of the Constitution. See BREST, supra, at 37; Powell, supra note 84, at 
939. 
 96 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). 
 97 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326–27 (1816). 
 98 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824). 
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McCulloch v. Maryland also provides a good example of natural 
law interpretation, focusing not only on the literal text of the Con-
stitution, but also on arguments of purpose and constitutional struc-
ture. As is stated in McCulloch: 
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the 
subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, 
and of all the means by which they may be carried 
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a le-
gal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the hu-
man mind. It would probably never be understood by 
the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its 
great outlines should be marked, its important ob-
jects designated, and the minor ingredients which 
compose those objects be deduced from the nature of 
the objects themselves . . . . It is also, in some degree, 
warranted by their having omitted to use any restric-
tive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and 
just interpretation. In considering this question, then, 
we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are 
expounding.99 
Reflecting support for a living constitution model of interpreta-
tion, Chief Justice Marshall also noted for the Supreme Court in 
McCulloch: 
This provision is made in a constitution intended to 
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To 
have prescribed the means by which government 
should, in all future time, execute its powers, would 
have been to change, entirely, the character of the in-
strument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It 
would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by 
immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at 
all, must have been seen dimly, and which can best 
be provided for as they occur. To have declared that 
the best means shall not be used, but those alone 
                                                                                                             
 99 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407 (emphasis in original). 
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without which the power given would be nugatory, 
would have been to deprive the legislature of the ca-
pacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its rea-
son, and to accommodate its legislation to circum-
stances.100 
Justice Story similarly noted for the Supreme Court in Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 
The constitution unavoidably deals in general lan-
guage. It did not suit the purposes of the people, in 
framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide 
for minute specifications of is powers, or to declare 
the means by which those powers should be carried 
into execution. It was foreseen that this would be a 
perilous and difficult, if not an impracticable, task. 
The instrument was not intended to provide merely 
for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure 
through a long lapse of ages, the events of which 
were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Provi-
dence.101 
                                                                                                             
 100 Id. at 415–16 (emphasis in original). 
 101 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816). See also Feldman, supra note 87, at 
288, 306–310, 317–28, 334, 350 (noting that neither the Justices nor treatise writ-
ers nor framers and ratifiers of the founding era adopted any kind of static “rea-
sonable man” concept for constitutional interpretation, but, consistent with “living 
constitutionalism,” and with “natural law,” they adopted a range of arguments 
based on text, context, purpose, constitutional structure, history, legislative and 
executive practice, and precedents) (citing, inter alia, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796); Calder 
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 
(1810); and Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827)). Professor Feld-
man calls this approach “eclecticism” or “pragmatism.” Feldman, supra note 87, 
at 288. Consistent with the terminology in this Article, it is better to style it as 
“natural law,” since, as Feldman details, the Justices used pragmatic arguments to 
the extent they reflected constitutional, text, content, purpose (including the Con-
stitution’s preamble), history, and legislative or executive practice, which is con-
sistent with natural law interpretation, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, 
§ 12.2.2.1, at 364, but did not use their own sense of social policy separate from 
that plausibly related to the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent. To the extent “pragma-
tism” suggests instrumentalist use of contemporary social policies that might be 
reflective of the judge’s own sense of social policy, not that of the framers and 
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Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have noted that their approach 
does not adopt the static view of the Constitution. For example, they 
stated in United States v. Lopez: 
The Federal Government undertakes activities today 
that would have been unimaginable to the Framers in 
two senses: first, because the Framers would not 
have conceived that any government would conduct 
such activities; and second, because the Framers 
would not have believed that the Federal Govern-
ment, rather than the States, would assume such re-
sponsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon the 
Federal Government by the Constitution were 
phrased in language broad enough to allow for the 
expansion of the Federal Government’s role.102 
During his confirmation hearing in 1989, Justice Souter de-
scribed this approach as following the original meaning of the Con-
stitution, rather than following the framers’ and ratifiers’ specific 
original intent.103 Justice Souter stated, “[Justices ought to identify 
the] principle that was intended to be established as opposed simply 
to the specific application that that particular provision was meant 
to have by, and that was in the minds of those who proposed and 
framed and adopted that provision in the first place.”104 This is con-
sistent with interpretation by Chief Justice John Marshall, of whom 
it is understood 
carefully distinguished between the conscious, spe-
cific, concrete policy goal that may have motivated a 
particular constitutional clause, on the one hand, and 
the broader, more generalized principle, or rule of 
                                                                                                             
ratifiers, see supra note 53 and infra note 119, that does not reflect early Supreme 
Court practice. 
 102 514 U.S. 549, 574–75 (1995) (Kennedy, J., joined by O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992)). 
 103 See David J. Garrow, Justice Souter Emerges, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 25, 
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/25/magazine/justice-souter-emerges.
html?pagewanted=all. 
 104 Id. See generally Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of 
Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 613–19 (1998) (discussing “principles” ver-
sus “original practices”). 
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law, that the clause established, on the other hand. 
For Marshall, constitutional law consisted of the lat-
ter rather than the former.105 
Brown v. Board of Education106 represents a good example of 
the difference between static, specific intent at the time of ratifica-
tion and a broader, more general concept that can evolve over time. 
As is discussed by Professor Ronald Dworkin in his book Law’s 
Empire, “conceptions” are the specific, discrete ideas or examples 
held by individuals, while “concepts” are the broader, more abstract 
idea reflected in the conceptions.107 As elaborated by Professor Fal-
lon: 
An example comes from equal protection jurispru-
dence. The authors of the fourteenth amendment ap-
parently did not specifically intend to abolish segre-
gation in the public schools. Yet they did intend gen-
erally to establish a regime in which whites and 
blacks received equal protection of the laws – an as-
piration that can be conceived, abstractly, as reaching 
far more broadly than the framers themselves specif-
ically had intended.108 
                                                                                                             
 105 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 84, at 9. Similarly, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
noted during her confirmation hearing, that the general concept of equality in the 
Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is broad enough to embody a principle of equal rights for women, 
despite the fact that the specific views of Thomas Jefferson and others in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries were not ready for women to be equal participants 
in public life. During her confirmation hearing, Justice Ginsburg, quoting Jeffer-
son, stated that “[t]he appointment of women to public office is an innovation for 
which the public is not prepared . . . . Nor, Jefferson added, am I,” but then noted 
that she presumed that if Jefferson were alive today he would have a different 
specific view on the role of women in public life based on the general concept of 
equality in which he believed—each individual’s equal and unalienable right to 
“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” See The Supreme Court; Excerpts 
from Senate Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/21/us/the-supreme-court-excerpts-from-sen-
ate-hearings-on-the-ginsburg-nomination.html?pagewanted=all. 
 106 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
 107 DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 70–71. 
 108 Fallon, supra note 6, at 1199 (citations omitted). 
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Thus, despite the fact that segregated schools were common in 
1868, including in the District of Columbia, a justice faithful to the 
general concept of equality placed into the Fourteenth Amendment 
could hold, as in Brown, that segregated schools deny individuals 
equal protection.109 To the extent that the framers and ratifiers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment had natural law moral principles in mind, 
they would have intended to place into the Fourteenth Amendment 
that general concept of equality, not to control later decisions by 
their specific historical practices. 
In short, a natural law approach does not commit the judge to 
the view that the concepts embedded in the Constitution have a static 
content that, when applied to specific problems, have an unchanging 
meaning.110 From an Enlightenment perspective, it has been noted, 
“No great political theory, including Locke’s, is the last word on its 
own best interpretation, and critical advances in political theory may 
enable us better to understand and interpret the permanent truths im-
plicit in the theory and to distinguish these from its lapsing un-
truths.”111 From a Burkean perspective, “the limits of human ration-
ality require a constitution that can adapt in response to the unfore-
seen difficulties, changed circumstances, and outright mistakes that 
any human endeavor will inevitably entail.”112 From a classic/Chris-
tian Augustinian perspective, it has been noted that constitutional 
concepts are “timeless principles of human nature and political or-
der,” but, with respect to the framers and ratifiers, “[l]ike any of us, 
their immediate preferences were sometimes at odds with, and cer-
tainly did not exhaust, their aspirations.”113 
                                                                                                             
 109 On the issue of whether, in any event, arguments of history support the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, compare Michael W. McConnell, Original-
ism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 949–55 (1995) (dis-
cussing aspects of historical intent support Brown) with Michael J. Klarman, 
Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor 
McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884–1914 (1995) (discussing history at the 
time of ratification does not support Brown). 
 110 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 12.3.3, at 382. 
 111 DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
13 (1989). 
 112 Young, supra note 87, at 668–69. 
 113 GRAHAM WALKER, MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
THOUGHT: CURRENT PROBLEMS, AUGUSTINIAN PROSPECTS 153–56 (1990) (cita-
tion omitted). 
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Under such an approach, a person who wishes to consistently 
apply a general concept in which the individual believes may have 
to adjust one or more specific views, which currently are not con-
sistent with that general concept.114 Through this process, a dynamic 
is created whereby, over time, more of an individual’s specific views 
will be a reflection of reasoned elaboration of general moral con-
cepts applied to current social realities. This is in contrast to specific 
views merely being the product of the individual’s past experiences, 
unthinking adherence to tradition, idiosyncratic preferences, or prej-
udice.115 This is similar to the view that the principles in founda-
tional religious documents, like the Bible, do not change, but that 
our understanding of the content of those principles can change, 
such as the difference between traditional and progressive religious 
understandings regarding slavery, anti-Semitism, and whether the 
earth revolves around the sun.116 
From a natural law interpretation perspective, the framers and 
ratifiers would wish later generations to give that concept the more 
enlightened and progressive reasoning, since they were not putting 
into the Constitution their own fixed, subjective, specific views 
about some matter, but rather, were placing into the Constitution 
broad natural law principles whose content they believed was inde-
pendent of their specific views, and which would better be discov-
ered over time through the application of reason.117 As responsible 
believers in natural law, the framers would have been somewhat 
more humble than those who support a fixed, static Constitution 
give them credit concerning whether their reasoning at the time of 
ratification fully reflected a complete understanding of the natural 
                                                                                                             
 114 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 383. 
 115 See id. 
 116 On this topic, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 16.1, at 505–09. Note 
that this evolution in constitutional meaning consistent with (a) more enlightened 
understanding of general concepts, (b) legislative, executive, and social practice, 
and (c) judicial precedents is different than arguing meaning should change based 
on contemporary dictionary definitions of words, as opposed to common meaning 
at the time of ratification. No less an authority than James Madison warned, 
“[w]hat a metamorphosis would be produced in the code of law if all of its ancient 
phraseology were to be taken in its modern sense.” BARNETT, supra note 14, at 
99 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), reprinted 
in WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 91, at 191. 
 117 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 383. 
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law principles in which they believed.118 Justice Kennedy phrased 
this point well when he wrote for the Court in 2003: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth 
Amendment known the components of liberty in its 
manifold possibilities, they might have been more 
specific. They did not presume to have this insight. 
They knew times can blind us to certain truths and 
later generations can see that laws once thought nec-
essary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As 
the Constitution endures, persons in every generation 
can invoke its principles in their own search for 
greater freedom.119 
                                                                                                             
 118 See id. 
 119 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). Of course, an Enlight-
enment perspective is more likely than a Burkean or Augustinian perspective to 
embrace fully an evolved understanding of the general intent lying behind a nat-
ural law concept, since the Burkean perspective is tied more closely to evolution 
based on tradition, not reason, see Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 353, 366–71 (2006), and the Augustinian perspective is also wary 
of the competencies of human reason. See WALKER, supra note 113, at 159 (“[I]f 
all interpreters partake of a morally vitiated human nature themselves, then re-
sponsible judges will be modest, wary, and self-critical as they interpret the Con-
stitution—especially since their interpretive decisions affect many other peo-
ple.”). 
  This form of natural law interpretation does not support a more activist 
model of interpretation, where judges could resort to natural law principles 
thought best by the judge, even if not embedded in the Constitution. See Walter 
F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 712 
(1980); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 703, 709 (1975). Such suggestions are really a form of instrumentalist inter-
pretation whereby contemporary social policies, with no connection to the Con-
stitution, are appropriate to consider. On instrumentalist constitutional interpreta-
tion, see supra text accompanying notes 53–62; KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 
325–53. On “instrumentalism” generally, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, 
§ 3.3, at 47–54; Summers, supra note 31, at 863–74, 908–23. The “true original-
ist” approach to interpretation described in this Article, where judges should resort 
only to natural law principles reflected in constitutional text, is consistent with the 
social contract natural law approach dominant during the framing and ratifying 
period. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 69–70; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
84, at 2–3, 12–33; Moore, supra note 70, at 133–37 n.71. Even Justice Chase’s 
famous resort to natural law in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–89 (1798), 
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B.  Legislative, Executive, and Social Practice 
Legislative or executive practice under a constitutional provi-
sion can provide a gloss on meaning to the Constitution, in addition 
to illuminating the meaning at the time of ratification. Such a gloss 
changes the meaning of the Constitution from what it was before, 
and thus is embraced by those who adopt a living Constitution as 
their model of constitutional interpretation. As Justice Story ob-
served in 1833, “[T]he most unexceptionable source of collateral in-
terpretation is from the practical exposition of the government itself 
in its various departments upon particular questions discussed, and 
settled upon their own single merits.”120 
James Madison similarly noted about interpretation in 1830 that 
“[t]he early, deliberate and continued practice under the Constitu-
tion, as preferable to constructions adapted on the spur of occasions, 
and subject to the vicissitudes of party or personal ascendencies” is 
relevant in determining constitutional meaning.121 As noted previ-
ously,122 although as a congressman in 1791 Madison had opposed 
Congress creating a national bank as unconstitutional, in 1815 and 
1816, when Madison was President, he supported the bank’s consti-
tutionality based upon “repeated recognitions under varied circum-
stances of the validity of such an institution, in acts of the Legisla-
tive, Executive, and Judicial branches of the Government, accompa-
nied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the gen-
eral will of the nation.” Thus, for Madison, Congress’ power to cre-
ate a bank changed from 1791, when Madison considered it uncon-
stitutional, to 1815 and 1816, when it became constitutional, based 
in part upon legislative and executive practice and social under-
standings (the “general will of the nation”). 
In the twentieth century, Justice Frankfurter made this same 
point in the specific context of executive action. In Youngstown 
                                                                                                             
is best understood in this light. See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 12.2.2.3, at 
369–71 nn.72–79. A related issue of interpretation regarding statutory interpreta-
tion according to the “equity of the statute” is discussed infra note 206. 
 120 STORY, supra note 93, at 392. 
 121 O’Brien, supra note 91, at 145 (quoting Letter from James Madison to 
M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), in WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 91, at 
370, 372. 
 122 See supra text accompanying note 95. 
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Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Frankfurter stated in his con-
currence: 
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long 
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never 
before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who 
have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making 
as it were such exercise of power part of the structure 
of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘ex-
ecutive Power’ vested in the President . . . .123 
Like Madison’s resort to the “concurrence of the general will of 
the nation” in his signing statement regarding the constitutionality 
of a national bank,124 most natural law jurists are willing to consider, 
at least to some extent, social understandings or practices regarding 
the meaning of constitutional provisions. For example, in Atkins v. 
Virginia, the majority, which included Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter, acknowledged social understandings as part of its con-
sideration of whether the death penalty for mentally challenged 
criminals was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.125 Natural law judges should be willing to consider 
even social practice from other countries, not for its social policy 
value, but to the extent that practice helps illuminate a reasoned 
elaboration of a universal natural law concept placed into the Con-
stitution, something judges did during the original natural law era.126 
                                                                                                             
 123 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 124 See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 125 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). In contrast, the dissent noted, 
[T]he Court’s decision to place weight on foreign laws, the 
views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion 
polls . . . is antithetical to considerations of federalism, which 
instruct that any ‘permanent prohibition upon all units of dem-
ocratic government must [be apparent] in the operative acts 
(law and the application of laws) that the people have ap-
proved.’ 
Id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (quoting 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 126 See generally David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional 
Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 574–83 (2001) (discussing judicial practice from 
1789 through the Civil War); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 
31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2006) (discussing cases where the Constitution refers to 
international law or international law is used as a background principle to identify 
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Since many of the framers and ratifiers believed in natural law, 
many of the individual rights in the Constitution were likely in-
tended to have such a universal natural law base.127 Naturally, inter-
national sources that can best shed light on that natural law concept 
would be most properly used, such as European decisions regarding 
aspects of basic human rights and human dignity.128 For example, 
this explains why it was European views against banning homosex-
ual sodomy, rather than views of other nations around the world that 
were used by Justice Kennedy in his opinion in Lawrence v. 
Texas.129 
C.  Judicial Precedents and a Living Constitution 
Under the natural law approach, a sequence of judicial prece-
dents interpreting a constitutional provision can provide a gloss on 
meaning that can modify the framers’ and ratifiers’ initial specific 
views. As Professor Powell has noted when discussing the writings 
of James Madison, under the traditional natural law model, 
usus, the exposition of the Constitution provided by 
actual governmental practice and judicial precedents, 
could ‘settle its meaning and intention of its authors.’ 
Here, too, [Madison] was building on a traditional 
foundation: the common law had regarded usage as 
valid evidence of the meaning of ancient instruments, 
and had regarded judicial determinations of that 
meaning even more highly.130 
As Madison himself said, “All new laws, though penned with 
the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature 
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, 
                                                                                                             
the territorial scope of the Constitution or the powers of the national government, 
or delineate structural relationships within the federal system or individual rights 
cases). 
 127 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 12.2.2.1, at 365. 
 128 See id. at 366. 
 129 539 U.S. 558, 560, 576 (2003) (discussing, among other things, the “values 
we share with a wider civilization,” including opinions of the European Court of 
Human Rights). 
 130 Powell, supra note 84, at 939 (footnotes omitted). 
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until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of par-
ticular discussions and adjudications.”131 
Professor Young made a similar point that Edmund Burke would 
counsel following a clear, well-established later judicial tradition 
elaborating the general concept used by the framers and ratifiers in 
explicit constitutional text, even if it could be shown that the judicial 
precedents conflicted with the framers’ and ratifiers’ original spe-
cific views.132 Regarding how precedent gets used, Professor Young 
noted that Burke would agree with Madison that a “series of partic-
ular discussions and adjudications”133 carries interpretive weight be-
yond the impact of mere stare decisis.134 Professor Young stated, 
When used as a means of divining the present mean-
ing of a constitutional provision as it has evolved 
over time, precedent itself functions as a tool of in-
terpretation; rather than offering a reason to adhere 
to an incorrect interpretation under the doctrine of 
stare decisis, the force of precedent enters into the 
initial determination of what the correct interpreta-
tion is.135 
In his writing, Professor Dworkin has called this use the “gravi-
tational force” of precedent, which is distinct to a precedent’s “en-
actment force.”136 In Dworkin’s terminology, the “enactment force” 
of a precedent focuses on the narrow question of whether to follow 
an incorrect interpretation under the doctrine of stare decisis based 
                                                                                                             
 131 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 91, at 229 (James Madison). 
 132 See Young, supra note 87, at 664–65. In contrast, at least one standard 
originalist commentator has disagreed with this understanding of a Burkean ap-
proach, and has counseled Burkean judges to follow text rather than precedent, 
both on original meaning grounds and because such an approach, in the author’s 
view, best reflects American judicial traditions. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tra-
dition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 
635, 636–37 (2006). 
 133 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 91, at 229 (James Madison). 
 134 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 367. 
 135 Young, supra note 87, at 691–92 (emphasis in original). 
 136 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1977). 
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upon practical reasons.137 Some of these practical reasons are “con-
venience, reliance on accumulated experience, and the usefulness 
for planning of being able to predict what a court will decide.”138 
The “gravitational force” of a precedent, however, arises from “the 
fairness of treating like cases alike.”139 Thus, the “gravitational 
force” of a precedent “may be explained by appeal, not to the wis-
dom of enforcing enactments,” but to fairness.140 
This view of “reasoned elaboration” of the law, where the rea-
soning of prior cases exerts an influence on what the doctrine means 
today, independent of the “enactment force” of the precedent’s core 
holding, is, according to Professor Dworkin, a “distinctive fact about 
common law adjudication.”141 More generally, it is a distinctive fact 
about constitutional law adjudication when in a common-law mode, 
as for interpretation of broad concepts placed into the Constitution, 
where there is a “good deal of the common law type of reasoning in 
the constitutional cases,”142 based on the view that the framers and 
ratifiers intended “the answers develop over time in a common-law 
fashion.”143 
                                                                                                             
 137 See Ronald Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. REV. 1201, 1230 (1977) (re-
sponding to Kent Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. 
REV. 991, 1008 (1977)). 
 138 Id. See also Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 
90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1176–84 (2006) (discussing the benefits of stare decisis 
and “bedrock precedents”). 
 139 Dworkin, supra note 137, at 1230 (quoted in Greenawalt, supra note 137, 
at 1008). 
 140 Id. at 1231. 
 141 Id. at 1230. 
 142 Edward H. Levi, The Sovereignty of the Courts, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 
695 (1983). 
 143 DANIEL A. FARBER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 79 (1993). On such 
common-law constitutionalism, see Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules 
and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 
221, 265–72 (1973). Because they were immersed in the Anglo-American system 
of judicial decisionmaking, the framers’ and ratifiers’ views were grounded in the 
grand traditions of the Anglo-American common law system. This approach fa-
vors principles such as reasoned elaboration of the law, fidelity to precedent, de-
ciding cases on narrower grounds where possible, and deciding most cases only 
after full briefing and argument. See Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common 
Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443, 450–63 (1975); Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason 
of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35, 38–39 (1981); Church 
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The principle of “reasoned elaboration” includes clearly defined 
tests that work in practice, coherence and consistency in legal cate-
gories, and avoidance of functional balancing tests that are situation-
specific and not easily reconcilable with other aspects of legal doc-
trine, unless contemporaneous sources and subsequent events man-
date use of such tests.144 These notions are implicit in the factors 
stated in Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter’s joint opinion in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, for determining when a judge should 
find the impetus to overrule precedent: (1) it is unworkable in prac-
tice; (2) it creates an inconsistency or incoherence in the law; (3) a 
changed understanding of facts has undermined its factual basis; (4) 
it represents a substantially wrong or substantially unjust interpreta-
tion of the Constitution; or (5) it raises concerns about a “commit-
ment to the rule of law.”145 The Court has subsequently added 
whether the decision was “well-reasoned” to factor (4)’s concern 
                                                                                                             
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 571–76 (1993) 
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing decid-
ing cases on narrower grounds, the importance of full briefing and argument, and 
reasoned and consistent elaboration of the law). Deciding cases on narrower, fact-
specific grounds, has been called “judicial minimalism” by Professor Sunstein. 
He has noted that such “minimalism” is most useful in giving “flexibility to po-
litically accountable officials . . . in difficult cases at the frontiers of constitutional 
law [where] judges would do best to avoid firm rules that they might come to 
regret.” Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 
1899, 1907–15 (2006); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3–6 (1999). 
 144 Reasoned elaboration of the law would also include, in some version, com-
mitment to developing the law according to “neutral principles.” On “neutral prin-
ciples,” see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 
73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of 
Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 982 (1978). For a critique of the pos-
sibility of developing the law according to neutral principles, see Mark V. Tush-
net, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral 
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 781 (1983). 
 145 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992). For discussion of these factors for overruling 
a precedent, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, §§ 4.3, 7.3.3–7.3.4, at 84–89, 
209–28. The Supreme Court has also discussed these same factors in the context 
of statutory interpretation. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295–96 
(1996); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173–74 (1989). Indeed, 
the Court has noted the even greater force of precedent in statutory construction 
because of the easier resort to amendment in such cases to correct faulty interpre-
tation. Id. at 172–73, 175 n.1. 
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with a “substantially wrong” or “substantially unjust” interpretation 
as a reason to overrule precedent.146 
Absent the “gravitational force” of precedents, one might adopt 
the view, stated by Justice Scalia, that a precedent should be over-
turned if that precedent is wrongly decided, unless the precedent 
represents settled law147 or, as stated by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the 
precedent has engendered substantial reliance.148 For natural law 
judges, a precedent should not be overruled, even if it is not settled 
law, or there has been no substantial reliance on it, unless one or 
more of the factors discussed above counsels for it to be over-
ruled.149 
D.  The Lack of Historical Evidence for the Static Approach to 
Constitutional Interpretation 
Since the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified, positiv-
ism, as a counterpoint to natural law theory, has become an accepted 
dichotomy in legal theory.150 However, positivism was not any ma-
jor part of the backdrop of eighteenth century legal theory. One of 
                                                                                                             
 146 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362–63 (2010) (discussing 
whether decision is “well reasoned” as part of whether it is substantially wrong 
and deserves overruling) (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93 
(2009)). 
 147 See R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, How the Supreme Court is Deal-
ing with Precedents in Constitutional Cases, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 973, 990–95 
(1996) (“Justices should do what is legally right by asking two questions: (1) Was 
Roe correctly decided? (2) Has Roe succeeded in producing a settled body of law? 
If the answer to both questions is no, Roe should undoubtedly be overruled.”) 
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). As Justice Scalia noted, considering precedents 
after a constitutional provision is ratified is inconsistent with a pure static ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation, and thus “stare decisis is not part of my 
originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it.” SCALIA, supra note 5, at 
140 (emphasis in original). 
 148 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 233 (1995). See also 
Kelso & Kelso, supra note 147, at 993–95 (discussing the differences between 
Holmesian and natural law judges when considering overruling precedents). 
 149 See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 147, at 995–96. The factors counseling 
overruling of precedent are discussed supra text accompanying notes 144–46. 
 150 See Frederick Schauer, The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism, 101 VA. 
L. REV. 957, 974 (2015). 
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the first modern spokesmen for positivism was Jeremy Bentham,151 
who was only twenty-eight years old when the Declaration of Inde-
pendence was drafted, yet noted in a pamphlet his view that the nat-
ural law rhetoric in the founding document was “nonsense upon 
stilts”152—indicating how far his view was from the dominant opin-
ion of the framing and ratifying generation. Even with respect to 
English law, during his lifetime, Bentham was a known critic of the 
existing ways of thinking about the law.153 The emergence of Ben-
tham’s positivism as a counterpoint to natural law really began in 
1832 when Englishman John Austin published his positivist mani-
festo, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined.154 
One can find increasing discussion and acceptance of Bentham’s 
and Austin’s ideas in the United States in the second half of the nine-
teenth century in common law, statutory interpretation, and consti-
tutional law.155 Positivism has continued as a major force in legal 
jurisprudential thinking, particularly in the form of H.L.A. Hart’s 
concept that each society has a positive “rule of recognition” that 
defines which acts count as valid legal enactments.156 The emer-
gence of positivism can lead to a more fixed or static view of con-
stitutional interpretation, as it is consistent with positivism to view 
the task of the framers and ratifiers as placing their fixed preferences 
                                                                                                             
 151 Id. at 960 (“[T]he individual most associated with the origins of legal pos-
itivism in the modern and analytic jurisprudential tradition is Jeremy Bentham.”). 
 152 Kevin F. Ryan, We Hold These Truths, 31 VT. B.J. 9, 12 (2005) (citing 
Jeremy Bentham, A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights, in 
BENTHAM’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 257, 269 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1973) (“[n]atural 
rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, 
nonsense upon stilts”). 
 153 See Schauer, supra note 150, at 961 (“The connection between Bentham’s 
contempt for the English legal system of the late eighteenth century and his adop-
tion of what we now think of as a positivist perspective is not difficult to discern. 
Bentham was, above all, a reformer.”) (footnote omitted). 
 154 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Lon-
don, John Murray 1832). On nineteenth century “positivism” generally, see 
AUGUSTE COMTE, A GENERAL VIEW OF POSITIVISM 1 (J. H. Bridges trans., Trüb-
ner and Co. 1865) (1848). 
 155 See generally GILMORE, supra note 47, at 11–13 (discussing a pre-Civil 
War “Golden Age” and a post-Civil War to World War I “formalist” or “concep-
tualist” age); HALL, supra note 70, at 211 (“From the Civil War to about 1900 the 
trend favored the formalistic and conservative judicial approach . . . .”). 
 156 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97–120 (1961). See also JOSEPH RAZ, 
THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 197–200 (2d ed. 1980). 
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into the Constitution.157 The more “analytic” version of positivism, 
reflected in the formalist interpretation theory of Justice Scalia, was 
most dominant on the United States Supreme Court from 1873 to 
1937, while the more “functional” version of positivism, represented 
by the interpretation theory of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, came 
to prominence on the Court from 1937 to 1954.158 
It is important to note that even from a positivist jurisprudential 
perspective, a judge would properly engage in the natural law style 
of judicial interpretation if the judge concluded that our framers’ and 
ratifiers’ “rule of recognition” was to interpret the Constitution in 
such a manner.159 In any event, during the framing and ratifying pe-
riod for the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Civil War 
amendments, natural law was the dominant background theory, and 
that approach to interpretation was adopted by early and continuous 
Supreme Court practice, as discussed above.160 Only a few individ-
uals at the time, including Thomas Jefferson, adopted arguments 
that viewed “constitutional propositions [as] deductions from static 
principles,” from which “no argument from subsequent precedent, 
practice, or experience could change [its] conclusion.”161 
                                                                                                             
 157 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 40–41 nn.20–22, 278–302 (discuss-
ing “Formalist Constitutional Interpretation”). 
 158 See id. at 405–24. 
 159 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 802–03 (“[T]he act of constitutional inter-
pretation in the United States may require every bit as much moral inspection as 
would be required by the most morally thick of natural law theories. The differ-
ence would be only that the tradition of positivism would see this as a contingent 
feature of modern American constitutionalism, capable of being different at other 
times or in other systems, while the natural law tradition would see this as an 
instance of a conceptual truth equally applicable to all existing and possible legal 
systems.”). 
 160 See supra text accompanying notes 72–88 (natural law theory); 89–149 
(judicial practice). 
 161 POWELL, supra note 77, at 92, 95. A few other Jeffersonian Republicans 
also adopted such views, particularly after 1800. See POWELL, supra note 77, at 
92, 110 (citing, inter alia, ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 
(1803) (Appendix on Tucker’s views on how to interpret the United States Con-
stitution)). However, Tucker’s views, and those of some other Jeffersonian Re-
publicans, that strict interpretation was intended by the framers and ratifiers must 
be understood against a backdrop of their contention that the States ratified the 
Constitution. They used that assertion to advance constitutional interpretation in 
favor of states’ rights. Id. at 109–10. Undermining that historical case for such 
states’ rights argumentation, Chief Justice Marshall reminded such states’ rights 
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Further, even Thomas Jefferson’s more formalist theory of in-
terpretation must be considered against a backdrop of his view that, 
since “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living,” each new gener-
ation has the right to make for itself a new Constitution.162 Under 
such a view, the Constitution would not be intended to endure for 
ages, but only until the next Constitution was adopted.163 A static 
model of interpretation makes better sense in such circumstances, 
for needed flexibility can come from newly-adopted constitutional 
language.164 Jefferson supported such a static model as he phrased 
the point, 
on every question of construction, [we] carry our-
selves back to the time when the Constitution was 
adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in the de-
bates, and instead of trying what meaning may be 
squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, con-
form to the probable one in which it was passed.165 
Thus, for initiatives that Jefferson supported, but which were of 
questionable constitutionality under his model of interpretation, like 
use of federal monies for internal improvements, Jefferson “felt that 
amendment of the Constitution” was proper.166 
                                                                                                             
advocates in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403–06 (1819), 
that the framers rejected existing state legislature ratification of the Constitution, 
which had occurred for the Articles of Confederation, and instead “the instrument 
was submitted to the people” (“We, the People”) voting in special state ratifying 
conventions. Given their willingness to make false historical assertions regarding 
ratification to advance a states’ rights agenda, one can wonder whether their as-
sertions regarding historical support for strict constitutional interpretation, which 
was also used to limit federal power and advance a states’ rights agenda, was 
similarly based on an inaccurate account of historical intent. 
 162 DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 302 (Kermit Hall & David O’Brien eds., 1994) (quoting Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 1788–1792, at 116 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1895) [hereinafter 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON]. 
 163 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 7.1, at 178. 
 164 See id. 
 165 MAYER, supra note 162, at 285. 
 166 Id. at 218–19. Even concerning the Louisiana Purchase, which was a very 
popular action, Jefferson preferred a constitutional amendment to ratify the pur-
chase. As stated by Professor Mayer, 
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Despite Jefferson’s support, the view of constantly, newly-
adopted constitutions was rejected by the framing and ratifying gen-
eration, including James Madison, for whom “too frequent appeals 
to the people to ‘new-model’ government would, ‘in great measure 
deprive, the government of that veneration which time bestows on 
everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest govern-
ments would not possess the requisite stability.’”167 Unlike the de-
tailed Constitutional Codes that emerged during the nineteenth cen-
tury in civil-law systems,168 the United States Constitution was not 
intended to be such a document.169 Imposing a style of interpretation 
that fits better with documents drafted as a code, like formalism’s 
focus on literal text, would be inconsistent with how the Constitu-
tion was drafted.170 Similarly, requiring constitutional amendment 
for every evolutionary change in understanding of a natural law con-
cept placed into the Constitution would be inconsistent with how the 
framers and ratifiers would have expected the constitutional amend-
ment process to work.171 Of course, differences in the purpose of a 
document and the ease of amendment counsel for different balances 
                                                                                                             
Although he eventually acquiesced in the Louisiana Purchase 
without the constitutional amendment that he believed was nec-
essary to sanction it, what is noteworthy is the degree to which 
he agonized over what may be fairly regarded as a technical 
question. Indeed, he was willing to jeopardize the acquisition of 
Louisiana, despite its immense strategic importance, in order to 
save the principle of strict construction. 
Id. at 215. 
 167 Id. at 301 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 91, at 314 (James 
Madison). 
 168 See Nuno Garoupa & Andrew P. Morriss, The Fable of the Codes: The 
Efficiency of the Common Law, Legal Origins, and Codification Movements, 2012 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1443, 1445 n.7 (“By 1868, the Napoleonic Code or codes related 
to it, governed ‘two-thirds of the civilized world.’”) (citation omitted). 
 169 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 178. 
 170 See id. For discussion of a constitution that was drafted with formalist pre-
suppositions more in mind, see infra text accompanying notes 205–06 (the Texas 
Constitution of 1876). 
 171 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at 178. See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 111–16; infra text accompanying notes 200–03. 
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when dealing with the interpretation of statutes or treaties––a topic 
outside the focus of this Article.172 
IV.  NON-ORIGINALIST ARGUMENTS FOR VARIOUS VERSIONS OF 
ORIGINAL MEANING 
To the extent that standard originalism cannot be defended as 
reflecting the actual historical intent of the framers and ratifiers, a 
non-originalist argument needs to be advanced to support that kind 
of interpretation. Under non-originalist approaches, the judge or 
commentator has to decide what principles of justice or sound social 
policy should be advanced.173 With regard to principles of justice, 
should it be, as Justice Scalia once remarked, “the philosophy of 
Hume, or of John Rawls, or of John Stuart Mill, or of Aristotle?”174 
There are four basic non-originalist approaches: (1) a “conse-
quentialist” approach, which looks to the jurist’s own view as to the 
best theory to yield the best consequences for society;175 (2) a “cur-
rent consensus” or “current majority” or “Dworkian” approach, 
which looks to what theory of interpretation is best reflected in ex-
isting doctrine;176 (3) a “progressive historicist” approach, which 
looks to what theory of interpretation is most likely to be reflected 
in the future, or what the “community eventually will hold,” if that 
can be determined;177 and (4) a “pluralist” model of interpretation 
                                                                                                             
 172 For brief discussion of these issues in the context of eighteenth-century 
thought about interpretation of statutes or treaties, see infra note 206 and accom-
panying text. 
 173 See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 46. 
 174 Id. at 45. 
 175 See, e.g., Ely, supra note 57, at 16–22, 43–52 (discussing a “judge’s own 
values” approach). 
 176 See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: 
THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 6 (2006) (“Constitutional constructivism draws our 
principles and rights from our constitutional democracy’s ongoing practice, tradi-
tion, and culture.”) (footnote omitted); DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 225, 400 (in-
terpretation according to the best political theory that explains the current legal 
order); Wellington, supra note 143, at 284–97 (community consensus model of 
interpretation). 
 177 See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 56, at 444 (“On this issue, the death penalty, 
I hope to embody a community, although perhaps not yet arrived, striving for hu-
man dignity for all.”). 
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reflecting some unspecified combination of original intent, conse-
quentialist, current majority, and progressive historicist reason-
ing.178 Each will be discussed in turn. 
A. Arguments For and Against a Static Version of Original 
Meaning on Consequentialist Grounds 
A consequentialist approach could end up supporting static con-
stitutional interpretation. For example, Professor Randy Barnett has 
argued for standard originalism on consequentialist grounds, inde-
pendent of the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent.179 Specifically, he has 
argued that “the impetus for an original meaning method of inter-
pretation” is suggested by the parol evidence rule.180 By such paral-
lel, Professor Barnett has supported a static original meaning con-
stitutional interpretation to “fulfill” the “evidentiary, cautionary, 
channeling, and clarification functions” of reducing agreements to 
writing.181 As Professor Barnett notes, although doctrines like “the 
statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, and the objective theory of 
contract interpretation” have been “attacked by law professors as 
backwards and formalist, they remain with us today,” and because 
the “Constitution is a law designed to restrict the lawmakers,” it is 
important to “lock in” its meaning and not have such language 
evolve over time.182 
Justice Scalia similarly expressed a preference for static consti-
tutional interpretation based, in part, on his view of the anti-evolu-
tionary nature of a constitution.183 He also supported it on grounds 
that such an approach tends to make constitutional interpretation 
more predictable,184 and on grounds of promoting judicial re-
straint.185 He also noted that in his view, “evolving standards [do not 
always] mark progress,” since societies do not “always mature, as 
opposed to rot.”186 
                                                                                                             
 178 See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 
72 TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1753 (1994). 
 179 BARNETT, supra note 14, at 91, 102–19. 
 180 Id. at 102. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 103–05. 
 183 See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 44–45. 
 184 See generally Scalia, supra note 33, at 1179. 
 185 See id. at 1179–80. 
 186 SCALIA, supra note 5, at 40–41 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Taking these arguments together, there seems to be four reasons 
to support static constitutional interpretation: (1) anti-evolutionary 
nature of a constitution; (2) judicial restraint; (3) consistency with 
the written nature of a constitution; and (4) predictability. Each will 
be considered in turn. 
1.  ANTI-EVOLUTIONARY NATURE VERSUS ANTI-
MAJORITARIAN NATURE OF A CONSTITUTION 
The anti-evolutionary argument for static interpretation makes 
most sense when dealing with structural issues of separation of pow-
ers and federalism. From an original intent perspective, the framers 
were concerned about limiting government power and ensuring no 
tyranny by one branch over another.187 The framers did not commit 
to a rigid, formalist approach to separation of powers, and in prac-
tice, functionalism should be considered.188 However, the words 
used in the Constitution are reasonably detailed and specific regard-
ing congressional and Presidential powers,189 and, in deciding cases, 
the Court has emphasized text over legislative/executive practice.190 
                                                                                                             
 187 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 19.1, at 771–73. As Madison noted, 
“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the gov-
erned; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, 
supra note 91, at 322 (James Madison). 
 188 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 19.1, at 771–73; R. Randall Kelso, 
Separation of Powers Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court and Four Doctri-
nal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 531, 564–72 
(1993), and sources cited therein; Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Sep-
aration of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1254–55 (1988); Peter L. 
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions 
– A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492–96 (1987). 
 189 See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II. Of course, even with respect to such specific 
language, this does not commit even a formalist interpreter to dictionary literal-
ism, but reading words in light of context. See John F. Manning, Textualism and 
the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 107–15 (2001) (discussing tex-
tualism, literalism, and both statutory purpose and context). 
 190 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–51, 959 (1983) (legislative 
veto provision unconstitutional, as it conflicts Bicameralism and Presentment 
Clauses, despite legislative and executive practice of its use in almost 300 statu-
tory provisions since 1932 through 1975); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 
417, 436–41 (1998) (unconstitutional to give President a line-item veto power, 
based on text of Presidential Veto power being limited to “Bills,” not line items 
in bills, despite legislative/executive support in passing the Line-Item Veto Act of 
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On the other hand, regarding individual rights provisions in the 
Constitution, it is clear from the natural law perspective of the fram-
ing and ratifying generation that the critical purpose of the Consti-
tution was not to be “anti-evolutionary,” but rather to be “anti-ma-
joritarian.”191 The point of natural law provisions involving individ-
ual rights was to remove certain decisions from the majoritarian 
democratic process based on the natural rights that individuals have 
to be free from majoritarian prejudices.192 As Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky has noted: 
[T]he framers openly and explicitly distrusted major-
ity rule; virtually every government institution they 
created had strong anti-majoritarian features. Even 
more importantly, the Constitution exists primarily 
to shield some matters from easy change by political 
majorities. The body of the Constitution reflects a 
commitment to separation of powers and individual 
liberties (for example, no ex post facto laws or bills 
of attainder, no state impairment of the obligation of 
contracts, no congressional suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus except in times of insurrection). Fur-
thermore, as Justice Jackson eloquently stated: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to 
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissi-
tudes of political controversy, to place them 
beyond the reach of majorities and officials 
and to establish them as legal principles to be 
applied by the courts. One’s right to life, lib-
erty, and property, to free speech, a free press, 
freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to 
                                                                                                             
1996). See also KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 19.4, at 793–811 (discussing 
“Legislative Power over National Policy”). 
 191 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term – Foreword: The 
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 74–75 (1989). 
 192 See id. 
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vote: they depend on the outcome of no elec-
tions.193 
2.  JUDICIAL RESTRAINT VERSUS JUDICIAL ROLE IN 
PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
From the perspective of our natural law tradition, the protection 
of individual rights to liberty and equality are paramount.194 As our 
Declaration of Independence states, “to secure these rights, Govern-
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed . . . .”195 Thus, a pluralistic democratic so-
ciety is viewed not as an end in itself, but rather, as the best means 
by which to ensure that society protects and advances that natural 
law set of rights. From that perspective, it would be counterproduc-
tive to engage in a static model of interpretation, since that model 
would allow for moral progress only when the democratic majority 
decided to adopt the more enlightened interpretation of the natural 
law principle. Yet, the whole point of enacting that constitutional 
provision was to remove the decision from democratic decision-
making. 
For example, when judges adopted post-1954 more enlightened 
interpretations of equal protection and due process to create ad-
vances in race relation cases, gender discrimination cases, and cases 
involving sexual orientation, they have acted consistent with a nat-
ural law understanding of those concepts.196 For the Court to have 
sat on the sidelines and hoped for the legislative and executive pro-
cesses alone to deal with those matters would have been a betrayal 
of what those natural law principles promote. For the most part, the 
Court did sit on the sidelines from the time the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified in 1868 until 1954, with little moral progress 
                                                                                                             
 193 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
 194 See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 72, at 3–23, 313–15, 361–83 (discuss-
ing influences of natural law on the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Re-
construction amendments, including the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 195 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 196 On the race, gender, and sexual orientation cases generally during the twen-
tieth century, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social 
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
2062, 2064 (2002). 
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made. The major exception was women’s suffrage in 1920, which 
was the product of an enormous and sustained social movement, and 
not equaled with respect to the failed Equal Rights Amendment of 
1972.197 
Admittedly, from the positivist perspective of formalism, such a 
view of judicial review raises counter-majoritarian difficulties, as 
discussed in the famous book by Professor Alexander Bickel, The 
Least Dangerous Branch, in 1962.198 The counter-majoritarian na-
ture of judicial review can still be a “central obsession of modern 
constitutional scholarship,” unless judicial review is linked to aiding 
participatory governance.199 Interpreting constitutional provisions 
in the natural law manner in which they were drafted aids in the 
participatory governance model of a constitutional republic adopted 
by the framers and ratifiers for our governance. 
3. CONSTITUTION AS CONTRACT VERSUS CONSTITUTION AS A 
CONSTITUTION 
Our Constitution was not drafted with Antonin Scalia’s or 
Randy Barnett’s presumptions about constitutional interpretation in 
mind. It has been noted that “[t]he federal constitution is a product 
of the Enlightenment. It manifests a qualified optimism about the 
power of government to improve society . . . . The powers delegated 
to all three branches of the federal government can grow to meet 
                                                                                                             
 197 See Thomas E. Baker, Towards a “More Perfect Union”: Some Thoughts 
on Amending the Constitution, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1, 13–15, 18 (2000) (“Ac-
cording to the account of one of the historic champions of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment, the effort to guarantee women the franchise took 72 years and included 56 
state-referenda campaigns, 480 state-legislative campaigns, 47 state-constitu-
tional conventions, 277 state-party conventions, 30 national-party conventions, 
and 19 campaigns before 19 successive Congresses—just to get the measure be-
fore the states for ratification.”) (citation omitted). 
 198 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (2d ed. 1986). 
 199 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 
One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334–36 (1998). 
For recent discussion of this issue, see Amy Coney Barrett, Countering the Ma-
joritarian Difficulty, 32 CONST. COMM. 61, 62–64 (2017) (reviewing RANDY E. 
BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND 
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE). 
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future needs.”200 On the assumption that the document would be in-
terpreted in light of a natural law style of interpretation, which 
would permit such growth in light of purpose, legislative and exec-
utive practice, and precedential arguments, drafting a formal amend-
ment process that is relatively difficult makes sense. 
From a static, fixed interpretation perspective, particularly one 
focused heavily on literal textual meaning, the Constitution would 
need to be much longer and more detailed, partaking, as Chief Jus-
tice Marshall warned in McCulloch v. Maryland, “of the prolixity of 
a legal code.”201 Provisions for formal amendment would likely be 
drafted to be easier, since formal amendment would be the primary 
means of adjusting the Constitution to new realities. For example, 
the Texas Constitution, drafted in 1876, and reflective of a formalist 
style of interpretation, is long and detailed; it contains over 80,000 
words, and thus is eight times longer than the United States Consti-
tution.202 As Professor Harold Bruff, of the University of Texas 
School of Law, has noted, 
Designed for a largely rural, agrarian state with less 
than a million inhabitants and no oil industry, the 
Texas Constitution has endured to govern [a] largely 
urban and industrialized state only because it is rela-
tively easy to amend . . . [while] encrusted with 326 
amendments [as of 1990, and 491 as of 2015].203 
From this perspective, to encrust a formalist, static model of in-
terpretation, requiring greater resort to the formal amendment pro-
cess onto a document, like the United States Constitution, whose 
amendment provisions were not drafted with a formalist model of 
                                                                                                             
 200 Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 
TEX. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
 201 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 202 See JANICE C. MAY, THE TEXAS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE 
GUIDE, at xxxv–xxxvi (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996). 
 203 Bruff, supra note 200, at 1339 (footnote omitted). “To amend the Texas 
Constitution, the amendment must be proposed by a joint resolution of the legis-
lature, must receive a two-thirds vote in each house, and must carry a simple ma-
jority of the voters at an election.” Id. n.16. See generally RESEARCH DIV. OF THE 
TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION SINCE 1867, 
at 1 (2016), available at http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/docs/amendments/Consta-
mend1876.pdf. 
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interpretation in mind, frustrates both the intent of the framers and 
ratifiers and makes little practical sense in terms of consequentialist 
arguments. 
As was discussed earlier,204 part of Randy Barnett’s analysis to 
support static constitutional interpretation is that a constitution is 
like a contract. However, unlike constitutions, contracts tend to be 
short-term documents, focused on defining rights to a discrete trans-
action, and contracts are relatively easy to amend.205 As was dis-
cussed earlier, Jefferson solved the problem of static interpretation 
and needed amendments by saying that society should make a new 
constitution each generation, but that was understandably not 
thought at the time, nor today, to be a good idea.206 
                                                                                                             
 204 See supra text accompanying notes 181–82; BARNETT, supra note 14, at 
102–03. 
 205 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(amendment valid even without consideration if it proposes a fair deal in light of 
unforeseen circumstances); U.C.C. § 2-209 (AM. LAW INST. 2014-2015) (in sale 
of goods cases amendment is valid even without consideration if done in good 
faith). More flexible interpretation is often built in to longer-term “relational” con-
tracts through concepts like “good faith” or “best efforts” requirements of perfor-
mance). See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Con-
tracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1089–95, 1111, 1136–39 (1981). And, even in stand-
ard, simple, non-relational contracts, if words are so general as to be ambiguous, 
resort is made to material outside a static view of interpretation, such as “course 
of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS §§ 202–03; U.C.C. § 2-208. A similar observation can be made 
about treaty interpretation, even from an eighteenth-century perspective. See Tutt, 
supra note 72, at 308 (“If the text was not clear, the next step was to look at [] the 
common usage of the terms together, then their reasonable import, then finally, if 
necessary, context, subject matter, consequences, and purposes.”). 
 206 See supra text accompanying notes 162–68. Treatises are typically in-
tended to be less evolutionary than Constitutions, and are more like contracts, 
although they are still different. As has been noted, “[T]reaties differ[] from com-
pacts and agreements by virtue of their weightiness, their duration, their tendency 
to involve multiple interlocking instruments, and their ability to bind the whole 
nation.” Tutt, supra note 72, at 354. 
  For statutory interpretation, statutes are easier to amend than the Constitu-
tion, although harder than contracts. In addition, evolution in statutory guidelines 
often comes today through deference by Congress to agencies to develop rules 
and regulations, and Court deference to an agency’s reasonable construction of its 
statutory mandate, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984), as well as Court deference to an agency’s own interpre-
tation of its regulation, see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997). His-
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4.  STATIC VERSUS LIVING ORIGINAL MEANING IN TERMS OF 
PREDICTABILITY 
While it is often claimed that a static view of interpretation leads 
to more predictable results than does a living model of constitutional 
interpretation, an evolving, living Constitution based on later legis-
lative, executive, and social practice, and judicial precedents is not 
necessarily less predictable than a static or fixed Constitution, par-
ticularly for the plethora of broad terms used in the Constitution.207 
                                                                                                             
torically, standard originalists supported Chevron and Auer deference. See Man-
ning, supra note 189, at 107–08 (“[A]n important facet of the textualist conception 
of legislative supremacy acknowledges congressional latitude to delegate law-
elaboration authority to agencies and courts. Hence, Congress can opt for more 
flexible, purposive interpretation simply by enacting standards rather than rules.”) 
(footnote omitted). Recently, some standard originalists have raised concerns 
about the Chevron and Auer doctrines, in part because these doctrines permit 
agencies to make law by modernizing interpretation of statutes in light of contem-
porary policies, not original intent. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. 
Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari) (citing concerns by himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Scalia); 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1150–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring). 
  Regarding statutory interpretation generally, from a natural law perspec-
tive the purpose of statute is critical, not mere literalism. See supra note 7 and 
accompanying text; Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (KB) (judges 
should inquire into the “mischief and defect” that the drafter was seeking to rem-
edy and should “make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and ad-
vance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance 
of the mischief . . . .”). This permits departure from strict literal interpretation. In 
addition, there is a debate about how much this focus on purpose can be used to 
advance statutory interpretation in light of the “way of equity” of the statute. War-
ren Lehman, How to Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 489, 493–
505 (discussing the use by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Plowden of “practical wisdom” 
and following the “way of equity” of the statute). For a back-and-forth on how 
much courts and commentators in the founding era adopted textualist versus eq-
uity of the statute interpretation, compare William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About 
Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 991–98 (2001) (courts and commen-
tators somewhat willing to resort to equitable interpretation) with John F. Man-
ning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1648–53 (2001). See also Manning, supra note 189, at 53–
55, 108–15 (courts and commentators more skeptical and concerned about “equi-
table interpretation”). 
 207 See generally Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Con-
stitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 
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For instance, regarding the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees a right to same-sex marriage, Justice Scalia noted 
in United States v. Windsor that while his position against recogniz-
ing such a right was predictable given his static theory of constitu-
tional interpretation, it was equally predictable from their living the-
ory of interpretation that Justice Kennedy and the majority would 
take the opposite view when the case came before the Court.208 That 
prediction was borne out two years later in Obergefell v. Hodges.209 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the contours of Justice Scalia’s 
conclusion for the Court that the Second Amendment includes an 
individual right to own firearms was made more predictable, not 
less, by his recitation of the legislative, executive, and social prac-
tice regarding the Amendment’s rights in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries, and by his discussion of judicial precedents.210 
In terms of predictability generally, the predictable result of a 
static, formalist approach to constitutional interpretation is to sup-
port locking in the values of an earlier generation.211 For our society, 
and those of Europe, those values are predisposed toward white, 
propertied, straight men holding traditional patriarchal views. As 
one author has noted, 
Justices Scalia and Thomas have voted to strike 
down federal affirmative action provisions, state af-
firmative action plans, measures designed to promote 
minority ownership of media, campaign finance leg-
islation that attempts to redress wealth inequities in 
the political process, portions of the Americans with 
                                                                                                             
236–59 (1988) (discussion of the problem of ambiguity in constitutional interpre-
tation). For traditional critiques of latent ambiguity in every act of interpretation, 
see David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructur-
alist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 136–57, 164–76 (1985). 
 208 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In my opinion, how-
ever, the view that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage 
is indicated beyond mistaking by today’s opinion.”) (emphasis in original). 
 209 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–08 (2015). 
 210 Compare 554 U.S. 570, 576–605 (2008) (discussing arguments of text, 
context, and history of the Second Amendment in the 18th century) with id. at 605–
28 (discussing arguments of legislative, executive, and social practice, and judi-
cial precedents, regarding the Second Amendment after its ratification). 
 211 See supra text accompanying notes 179–82 (discussing Professor Barnett’s 
“lock in” rationale to constitutional interpretation). 
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Disabilities Act, part of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, legislative attempts to promote minority 
representation, laws protecting women from vio-
lence, and laws protecting gays, the aged, and the dis-
abled from discrimination. They have found consti-
tutional violations in the actions of local communi-
ties seeking to protect their citizens from flooding, 
congestion, and environmental damage. They have 
even argued that the efforts of all fifty states to fund 
legal services for the poor by using the interest from 
a pooled account of lawyers’ trust funds which could 
not earn interest for their owners, was nevertheless 
an unconstitutional taking even though the owners 
suffered no economic loss.212 
Given this reality, it is perhaps no coincidence that the strongest 
supporters of static, formalist interpretation in the United States tend 
to be white, propertied, straight men (and those who support or rely 
on them for support).213 
At a general philosophical level, there are two main camps re-
garding the basic content of natural rights to liberty: (1) individual 
liberty includes the liberty to try to exploit others versus (2) individ-
ual liberty supports the rights of each individual equally to reach 
their full potential free from exploitation by others.214 Liberty as a 
liberty to try to exploit others reflects the political philosophies of 
writers like Thomas Hobbes, Friedrich Nietzsche, Ayn Rand, and 
Robert Nozick.215 
                                                                                                             
 212 William P. Marshall, The Judicial Nomination Wars, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 
819, 827–28 (2005). 
 213 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Princi-
pled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservativism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 5, 20–22 (2011) (noting that the strongest supporters of static, formalist 
interpretation tend to be those with traditional conservative political ideologies). 
 214 See Kelso, supra note 82, at 434 (“Some moral philosophers have taken 
the position that egotism or self-interest is rational, and therefore good and just, 
and have built their moral systems on a foundational principle of self-interest . . . . 
Most moral philosophers, however, reject this view.”). 
 215 See id. at 434 n.2 (“[Hobbes’] argument is concerned to persuade people 
to institute and maintain a sovereign. Given Hobbes’ psychological theory, people 
will do this only if they believe it is in their self-interest. Hence, self-interest is all 
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In contrast, most writers on natural rights to liberty affirm the 
principle that moral behavior is not self-centered —from more sec-
ular philosophers like John Locke,216 David Hume,217 Adam 
                                                                                                             
that can yield obedience to the laws of nature and political obedience to the sov-
ereign.”) (quoting 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 775 (Becker & Becker eds., 2d ed. 
2001)); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN xxiv–xxxiv (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1996) (1651); 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 906 (Becker & Becker 
eds., 1992) (“The morality of an abundant, creative, and egoistic power that Nie-
tzsche describes as the origin of human evolution ultimately becomes the norm of 
his own ethics.”); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 152–53 (Mar-
ion Faber, ed. & trans., 1998); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 
302 (1974) (“The model is designed to let you choose what you will, with the sole 
constraint being that others may do the same for themselves and refuse to stay in 
the world you have imagined.”); AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED 480–81 (1957) 
(during the trial of Hank Rearden, the defendant refuses to apologize for selfish 
pursuits of profit and power). 
 216 See Ryan, supra note 152, at 12 (“Natural rights theory, especially in its 
Lockean version, assumes that people have moral obligations independent of, or 
prior to, the formation of society or government, and that those obligations are 
best viewed as the requirement to respect the rights of others to life, liberty, and 
property.”) (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 135, at 
82–83 (Richard H. Cox ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1982) (1690)). 
 217 See, e.g., WILLS, supra note 79, at 193–201 (“moral sense,” not rational 
self-interest, determines morality from the Scottish Enlightenment perspective; 
discussing, inter alia, David Hume’s 1751 book, An Inquiry Concerning the Prin-
ciples of Morals). 
168 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:112 
 
Smith,218 Immanuel Kant,219 John Rawls,220 and Ronald 
Dworkin;221 to philosophers more associated with religious tradi-
tions, such as that of John Finnis222 or Robert George;223 or to main-
                                                                                                             
 218 In Adam Smith’s view, 
[T]o the selfish and original passions of human nature, the loss 
or gain of a very small interest of our own, appears to be of 
vastly more importance . . . than the greatest concern of another 
with whom we have no particular [connection] . . . . Before we 
can make any proper comparison of those opposite interests, we 
must change our position. We must view them, neither from our 
own place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet 
with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a third person, 
who has no particular [connection] with either, and who judges 
with impartiality between us . . . . When the happiness or misery 
of others depends in any respect upon our conduct, we dare not, 
as self-love might suggest to us, prefer the interest of one to that 
of many. The man within immediately calls to us, that we value 
ourselves too much and other people too little, and that, by do-
ing so, we render ourselves the proper object of the contempt 
and indignation of our brethren. 
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 135–38 (D.D. Raphael & 
A.L. Macfie, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1759). 
 219 Immanuel Kant’s view that reason compels an individual to “[a]ct only in 
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law” and for everyone to treat “all maxims of actions never 
merely as means, but as the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means, 
i.e., always at the same time as end,” rejects egotism, and thus is in direct contrast 
to Nietzsche’s egocentricism. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 37, 56 (Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 
2002) (1795). See also 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 666 (Becker & Becker eds., 
1992) (“This leads Kant to a new formulation of the categorical imperative: ‘Act 
always so that you treat humanity, in your own person or another, never merely 
as a means but also at the same time as an end in itself.’”) (quoting IMMANUEL 
KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785)). 
 220 John Rawls’ principle that justice derives from individuals agreeing on 
rules from an “original position” where no individual will be favored rejects 
Nozick’s egocentric approach. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17–22 
(1971). 
 221 Ronald Dworkin’s principle of “equal concern and respect” for others, 
based upon his view of the best interpretation of the existing moral principles of 
Western industrialized societies, represents a rejection of the morality of egoism. 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–73 (1977) (“Government 
must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and 
respect.”). 
2017] CONTRA SCALIA, THOMAS, & GORSUCH 169 
 
stream religious traditions, including Buddhism, Christianity, Hin-
duism, Islam, and Judaism224—and in various ways affirm as moral 
                                                                                                             
 222 John Finnis’ account of basic human goods, like knowledge and friendship, 
leads to a rejection of egotism in favor of loving one’s neighbor as part of the ideal 
of “integral human fulfillment.” John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 
38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (defining “integral human fulfillment” as “the 
ideal of the instantiation of all the basic human goods in all human persons and 
communities”). 
 223 See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND 
PUBLIC MORALITY 28–47, 219–28 (1993). Professor George modifies Aquinas’ 
approach to better account for principles of religious liberty, see id. at 41–42, 
while grounding morality in the non-egocentric advancement of the “common 
good.” Id. at 29. As Professor George noted, 
Human beings put their lives together in different ways by mak-
ing different choices and commitments based on different val-
ues that provide different reasons for choice and action. There 
is no single pattern anyone can identify as the proper model of 
a human life, not because there is no such thing as good and 
bad, but because there are many goods. 
Id. at 38–39. 
 224 See Mark 12:31 (King James) (“Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy-
self.”); ISSAC HERZOG, 1 THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW 386 (2d ed. 
1965) (“[B]ring the law as much as possible into line with the highest ethical 
norms, already presided over the growth and development of Jewish law, . . . 
[which] commanded ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself’ and ‘Love the stranger as 
thyself.’ (Leviticus xix, 19, and 33–34).”); Amihai Radzyner, Between Scholar 
and Jurist: The Controversy Over the Research of Jewish Law Using Compara-
tive Methods at the Early Time of the Field, 23 J.L. & REL. 189, 208 (2007); Zai-
nah Anwar & Jana S. Rumminger, Justice and Equality in Muslim Family Laws: 
Challenges, Possibilities, and Strategies for Reform, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1529, 1541 (2007) (discussing “the recognition of equality between men and 
women in Islam, the imperative of ijtihad (independent reasoning to arrive at a 
legal principle) in modern times, [and] the dynamics between what is universal 
for all times and what is particular to seventh century Arabia”); Imam Feisal Ab-
dul Rauf, What is Islamic Law?, 57 MERCER L. REV. 595, 600–603 (2006) (“Is-
lamic Law, called Sharia, starts off from these two commandments” – “Love of 
God” and “Love of Neighbor”); R. Mary Hayden Lemmons, Tolerance, Society, 
and the First Amendment: Reconsiderations, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 75, 89 (2005) 
(“Hinduism: ‘One should never do that to another which one regards as injurious 
to one’s own self’; and Buddhism: ‘Hurt not others in ways that you yourself 
would find hurtful.’”) (quoting JEFFREY WATTLES, THE GOLDEN RULE 192 n.2 
(1996). 
From this perspective, the specific doctrinal statements made in the various reli-
gious texts can all be understood as derivations from this basic point. For example, 
as Pope John Paul II noted in his encyclical, Veritatis Splendor, there is a direct 
connection between the specific principles of morality stated in the Bible and the 
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the basic principle of “love of neighbor as thyself.”225 It is this vision 
of morality that animated the framing and ratifying generation, not 
that of the morality of self-interest, and which underlies the sup-
posed liberty right to try to exploit others for one’s own gain, as long 
as they have equal rights to try to exploit you.226 
                                                                                                             
general non-egocentric moral command of “love of neighbor as oneself.” He 
stated: 
[T]he commandments belonging to the so-called “second tab-
let” of the Decalogue, the summary . . . and foundation of which 
is the commandment of love of neighbor: . . . In this command-
ment we find a precise expression of the singular dignity of the 
human person, “the only creature that God has wanted for its 
own sake.” The different commandments of the Decalogue are 
really only so many reflections on the one commandment about 
the good of the person, at the level of the many different goods 
which characterize his identify as a spiritual and bodily being 
in relationship with God 
POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR: THE SPLENDOR OF TRUTH para. 13 
(1993). 
 225 See supra notes 216–24 and accompanying text. For further discussion of 
this non-egocentric vision of morality from the perspective of modern views of 
moral reasoning around the world, see Kelso, supra note 82, at 434–45. 
 226 As phrased in a recent article regarding natural rights at the Founding, “nat-
ural rights called for good government, not necessarily less government.” Jud 
Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. 
COMMENT. 85, 87 (2017) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN 
CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 
(2016)). A similar thought is expressed in Lawrence B. Solum, Republican Con-
stitutionalism, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 175, 205 (2017) (“virtue is required for lib-
erty”) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2016)). 
Note that even though Jefferson did not embrace the natural law model of inter-
pretation, see supra text accompanying notes 161–68, he believed in a non-ego-
tistic vision of morality. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: 
A Christian Nation?, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13 (2008) (“For Jefferson, the funda-
mental precepts of morality, which he believed were held in common in all reli-
gions, were captured by Jesus’ maxims, ‘Treat others as you would have them 
treat you’ and ‘Love thy neighbor as thyself.’”) (quoting KERRY S. WALTERS, 
RATIONAL INFIDELS: THE AMERICAN DEISTS 181 (1992)). While his life was 
fraught with contradictions regarding slavery, see, e.g., Aaron Schwabach, Jeffer-
son and Slavery, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 63, 63–64 (1997), including his initial 
draft of the Declaration of Independence condemning slavery, which had to be 
removed to satisfy the objections of the Southern states, see id. at 79, Jefferson 
hoped eventually for a more just society free of exploitation of man by man. See 
id. at 86. As he stated in a letter, “I have sworn upon the altar of god, eternal 
hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man.” Letter from 
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B. Arguments For and Against the Other Non-Originalist 
Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation 
The three other kinds of non-originalist arguments regarding 
constitutional interpretation are: (1) a “current consensus” or “cur-
rent majority” or “Dworkian” approach, which looks to what theory 
of interpretation is best reflected in existing doctrine; (2) a “progres-
sive historicist” approach which looks to what theory of interpreta-
tion is most likely to be reflected in the future, or what the “commu-
nity eventually will hold,” if that can be determined; or (3) a “plu-
ralist” model of interpretation reflecting some unspecified combina-
tion of original intent, consequentialist, current majority, and pro-
gressive historicist reasoning.227 Each will be discussed in turn. 
1.  CURRENT CONSENSUS APPROACH 
A judge following a current consensus or current majority or 
Dworkian theory of justification would need to ask what judicial de-
cision-making style best reflects the current majority view.228 While 
such an approach would most likely have adopted a traditional nat-
ural law model of interpretation between 1789 and 1873,229 a “cur-
rent consensus” approach would have adopted a formalist style of 
interpretation between 1873 and 1937; a Holmesian style of inter-
pretation between 1937 and 1954; and an instrumentalist style of 
interpretation between 1954 and 1986.230 Since 1986, no interpreta-
tion style has commanded a majority on the United States Supreme 
Court, although the swing votes on the Court since 1986––Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter231––have reflected a version of nat-
ural law interpretation consistent with Ronald Dworkin’s concept of 
                                                                                                             
Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Sept. 23, 1800), reprinted in WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 162, at 460. 
 227 See supra text accompanying notes 176–78. 
 228 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 225, 400 (discussing interpretation 
according to the best political theory that explains the current legal order); See 
also Wellington, supra note 143, at 284–97 (community consensus model of in-
terpretation). 
 229 See discussion supra Sections III.A–B. 
 230 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, §§ 13.1–13.2, at 405–18. 
 231 See R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Swing Votes on the Current Su-
preme Court: The Joint Opinion in Casey and Its Progeny, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 
652–54, 657–71 (2002). See also KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, at § 16.3, nn.81–
83; § 16.4, nn.87–105. 
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“equal concern and respect,” or Adam Smith’s concept of the “im-
partial spectator.”232 
One weakness of this mode of justification is that it cannot ex-
plain why the interpretive approach should ever change, or criticize 
the interpretive approach of another era.233 For example, the Su-
preme Court’s approach to race discrimination changed from 1896, 
when the Court focused on existing customs and traditions to deter-
mine the reasonableness of legislation requiring whites and non-
whites to ride in separate railway cars in Plessy v. Ferguson,234 to 
1954, when the Court focused more on the reasoned demands of hu-
man dignity and not treating any individual as a second-class citizen 
in Brown v. Board of Education.235 From a current majority theory 
of justification, the Court could say after 1954 that race discrimina-
tion cases should follow Brown, but would have no grounds to reject 
Plessy as inappropriate for 1896 if the Plessy doctrine was consistent 
with majority legal doctrine then.236 
2.  PROGRESSIVE HISTORICIST APPROACH 
Under a progressive historicist theory of interpretation, the focus 
of legal justification is on what theory of interpretation is most likely 
to be reflected in the future.237 An approach based on cognitive and 
moral developmental psychology suggests the views an enlightened 
community “eventually will hold” will reflect a modern version of 
natural law.238 The growing convergence among Western industri-
alized democracies for judicial review based upon a modern version 
                                                                                                             
 232 For citation to Ronald Dworkin’s concept of “equal concern and respect,” 
see supra note 221 and accompanying text, and for citation to Adam Smith’s con-
cept of the “impartial spectator,” see supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 233 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 8.4.2.1, at 274. 
 234 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (“[T]he case reduces itself to the question 
whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation . . . [and in] determining 
the question of reasonableness it is at liberty to act with reference to the estab-
lished usages, customs and traditions of the people . . . .”). 
 235 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate [children] from others of similar 
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority 
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”). 
 236 For discussion of Plessy being consistent with majority legal doctrine in 
1896, see KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, § 26.2.1.1.B, at 1106–09. 
 237 See id. at 274. 
 238 See id. § 15.4.1, at 483–88 nn.71–81. 
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of natural law239 is consistent with this view of progressive histori-
cist reasoning. 
3.  PLURALIST APPROACH 
Professor James Fallon has argued for his interpretation theory 
on pluralist grounds.240 While such an approach has the strength of 
being able to pick and choose among all the other kinds of interpre-
tation approaches how much emphasis to give each in various cir-
cumstances,241 it has the weakness of not providing the judge with 
any guidance other than the judge’s own internal balance.242 As John 
Hart Ely famously remarked, it is likely to be adopted by a person 
who is “envisioning a Court staffed by Justices who think as they 
do.”243 
                                                                                                             
 239 See id. § 17.1.4, at 572 n.68 (citing Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and 
Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473, 483–85 (2003) (“Modern 
rights typically are phrased in terms of broad moral concepts—for example, the 
right of human dignity was made the central organizing value in the German Con-
stitution, and the prestige of that constitution, and of the German Constitutional 
Court in implementing it, have made that ‘dignity clause’ particularly influential 
for other constitutional regimes around the world.”). See also Kelso, supra note 
82, at 441–54 (discussing modern moral reasoning and emerging trends in consti-
tutional interpretation around the world); R. Randall Kelso, United States Stand-
ards of Review versus the International Standard of Proportionality: Conver-
gence and Symmetry, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455, 498–504 (2013). 
 240 See FALLON, supra note 21, at 5. See also Fallon, supra note 6, at 1252–68 
(discussing five categories of constitutional law arguments – text, historical intent, 
theory, precedent, and value – and refusing to pick any particular interpretation 
theory as presumptively valid). For discussion of other pluralist/pragmatic ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation, see Griffin, supra note 178; Posner, su-
pra note 53; Farber, supra note 53. 
 241 See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1243–46, 1252–68. Professor Fallon notes, 
“With incommensurability and indeterminacy limiting the autonomy of the indi-
vidual categories, the gestalt-like quest for coherence that is modeled by construc-
tivist coherence theory . . . fulfills an important function in our constitutional prac-
tice.” Id. at 1252. 
 242 As Judge Cardozo noted almost a century ago, “It may not have been the 
same principle for all judges at any time, nor the same principle for any judge at 
all times. But a choice there has been, not a submission to the decree of Fate[.]” 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 11 (1921). 
While that choice can become predictable for any judge over time, without any 
guiding formula, the ultimate choice is up to the judge’s own sense of prudence. 
 243 Ely, supra note 57, at 17. 
174 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:112 
 
4.  TRUE ORIGINALISM AS THE BEST APPROACH FROM ANY 
PERSPECTIVE 
As was discussed in Part III of this Article, the natural law theory 
of interpretation described herein best comports with both the sub-
jective original intent244 and objective original meaning245 of the 
Constitution. As discussed in Part IV, there are reasons to believe 
that the natural law theory described herein also represents the best 
moral theory from a consequentialist perspective,246 a current con-
sensus or Dworkian perspective,247 a progressive historicist perspec-
tive,248 and thus from a pluralist perspective (since it reflects a com-
bination of all the other perspectives).249 
As was noted earlier,250 Justice Kennedy has stated, “Had those 
who drafted and ratified the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of lib-
erty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more spe-
cific. They did not presume to have this insight.” A few recent Su-
preme Court Justices have approached constitutional interpretation 
from this properly humble Enlightenment natural law perspective: 
most prominently, current Justice Kennedy and former Justices 
O’Connor and Souter.251 
V. CONCLUSION 
Judges like Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Neil 
Gorsuch have claimed legitimacy for their interpretive approach in 
the humble view that they are just following the original meaning of 
the Constitution.252 That is not so. They are imposing on the Consti-
tution an interpretive structure that would have been foreign to the 
Constitution’s framers and ratifiers, leading to decisions that have 
no connection to how the framers and ratifiers would have expected 
                                                                                                             
 244 See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 245 See discussion supra Sections III.A–C. 
 246 See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
 247 See supra text accompanying notes 230–31. 
 248 See supra text accompanying notes 238–39. 
 249 See supra text accompanying note 178. 
 250 See supra text accompanying note 119 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578–79 (2003)). 
 251 See supra text accompanying notes 102–05, 119, 124–29, 144–49. See also 
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 6, §§ 12.3.2; 12.4.1–12.4.3, at 375–78, 393–403. 
 252 See supra text accompanying note 13. 
2017] CONTRA SCALIA, THOMAS, & GORSUCH 175 
 
their Constitution to be interpreted today. Imposing on that Consti-
tution a static/formalist interpretive methodology does not make 
practical sense. The main consequence of such an approach is a pre-
disposition to support the values of an earlier white, propertied, 
straight male patriarchal society. 
 
